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Abstract
The well-known problem of leader election in distributed systems is considered in a dynamic
context where processes may participate and crash spontaneously. Processes communicate
by means of buered broadcasting as opposed to usual point-to-point communication. In this
paper we design a leader election protocol in such a dynamic system. As the problem at
hand is considerably complex we adopt a step-wise renement design method starting from
a simple leader election protocol. In a rst renement a symmetric solution is obtained and
eventually a fault-tolerant protocol is constructed. This gives rise to three protocols. The
worst case message complexity of all protocols is analyzed.
A formal approach to the verication of the leader election protocols is adopted. The require-
ments are specied in a property-oriented way and the protocols are denoted by means of
extended nite state machines. It is proven using linear-time temporal logic that the proto-
cols satisfy their requirements. Furthermore, the protocols are specied in more detail in the
process algebra formalism ACP.
Keywords & Phrases: communication protocols, nite-state machines, leader election, pro-
tocol specication and verication, temporal logic, process algebra.
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1 Introduction
In current distributed systems several functions (or services) are oered by some dedicated
process(es) in the system. One might think of address assignment and registration, query
co-ordination in a distributed database system, clock distribution, token regeneration after
token loss, and so forth. Usually many processes in the system are capable to oer such a
functionality. However, at any time only one process is allowed to actually oer the function.
Therefore, one process |called the \leader"| must be elected to support that function.
Sometimes it suces to elect an arbitrary process, but for other functions it is important to
elect the process which is best according to some suitable criteria to perform that function.
In this paper we consider a distributed leader election (LE) protocol which elects the most
favourable process (relative to some criteria explained later) as leader. Each process has a
xed unique identity and a total ordering exists on these identities, known to all processes.
We assume a nite number of processes. The leader is dened as the process with the
largest identity among all participating processes. Realistic distributed systems are subject
to failures. The problem of leader election thus becomes of practical interest when failures are
anticipated. In this paper, processes behave dynamically|they may participate at arbitrary
moments and stop participating spontaneously without notication to any other process.
Crashed processes may recover at any time. Thus, a leader has to be elected from a set of
processes whose elements may change continuously. Processes communicate with each other
by exchanging messages via a broadcast network. This network is considered to be fully
reliable. A broadcast message is received by all processes except the sending process itself.
Communication is asynchronous and order-preserving.
Leader election is a special case of distributed consensus problems. Several impossibility
results have been obtained for such problems. For instance, in [DDS87] a number of orthogonal
characteristics are identied by which the existence of a solution for the distributed consensus
problem is determined. According to this classication our problem is solvable since we
consider order-preserving message delivery, broadcast communication and atomic send and
receive.
Due to the complexity of the design of a fault-tolerant LE protocol a step-wise renement
approach is adopted. That is, we develop a fault-tolerant protocol in three steps, each step
resulting in a LE protocol. We start with rather strong |and unrealistic| assumptions about
process and system behaviour. In each subsequent step these assumptions are weakened and
a protocol is constructed starting from the protocol derived in the previous step. The steps
of our design are as follows. In our initial design processes are considered to be perfect and a
leader is assumed to be present initially. A process may participate spontaneously, but once
it does it remains to do so and does not crash. In the second step, the assumption of an initial
leader is dropped. This leads to a fully symmetric protocol which uses an (abstract) timeout
mechanism to detect the absence of a leader. Finally, in the last step of our design processes
may crash without giving any notication to other processes.
As eciency plays an important role in the design of leader election protocols a complexity
analysis is given for each protocol presented in this paper. We focus our analysis on the
worst case message complexity which indicates the maximum number of messages needed to
elect a leader. For N participating processes the message complexity of our initial protocol
is O(N
2
), which can be improved to O(N) by adopting a tricky way of message buering.
3
Using this buer mechanism the last two protocols have a message complexity of O(N) and
O(N
2
), respectively, when no crashing processes are considered.
Existing designs are mainly focussed on reducing message and time complexity, scarcely pay-
ing attention to protocol verication, let alone providing a formal approach to verication.
However, for the design of complex communication protocols formal methods are indispens-
able. The starting-point of our designs is a requirements specication in linear-time temporal
logic. Temporal logic is an appropriate and expressive language for specifying properties
and behaviours of reactive systems, like communication protocols, in an abstract way. As a
protocol specication language we adopt extended nite state machines. The combination
of temporal logic and state-transition diagrams enables a formal verication of the designed
protocols. Such a verication is carried out for all presented protocols.
The protocols are also specied in the process algebra formalism ACP (Algebra of Commu-
nicating Processes). Both the separate components (protocol processes, buers, the com-
munication medium) and the parallel composition of these components are specied, giving
a complete formal specication of the whole distributed behaviour of the protocols. Some
aspects of a formal verication of the protocols within the process algebra framework are
discussed, but a complete verication of the protocols in ACP lies beyond the scope of this
paper. A validation of the protocols is achieved by simulation runs of the specications in
the executable formalism PSF (Process Specication Formalism), which is close to ACP.
The paper is further organized as follows. In section 2 the relation to existing work is pre-
sented. The requirements specication, design and complexity analysis of all three protocols
is presented in section 3. Furthermore, an introduction to the protocol description language
and to linear-time temporal logic is given in this section. In section 4 it is veried using tem-
poral logic that all protocols from section 3 satisfy the requirements. An introduction to ACP
and a specication of the protocols in ACP is given in section 5. Verication and validation in
ACP of the protocols is discussed in section 6. Finally, in section 7 some concluding remarks
are given and future work is addressed. In the rest of this paper, we use the term protocol as
a synonym for similar terms as distributed program, distributed algorithm, and so forth.
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2 Relation to Other Work
Leader Election algorithms
The problem of leader election was originally coined by [LeL77] in the late seventies and vari-
ous LE protocols have been developed since then. A broad range of solutions exists varying in
network topology (ring [LeL77, CR79, Pet82], mesh, complete network [KMZ84, AG91, Sin91],
and so on), communication mechanism (asynchronous, synchronous), available topology in-
formation at processes [LMW86, AvLSZ89], and so forth. A possible straightforward solution
to a broadcast network is to superimpose a topology |like a ring| on it and to adopt a
well-known solution for this topology. However, existing solutions are aimed at distributed
systems that are assumed to behave perfectly|no failures are anticipated and a xed number
of participating processes is assumed. Moreover, the specic characteristics of broadcasting
are not exploited.
Realistic distributed systems are subject to failures. A few LE protocols are known that
tolerate either communication link failures (see e.g. [AA88, SG87]) or process failures [GZ86,
IKWZ90, MNHT89, DIM93]. In [GZ86] the LE problem with a similar failure model and using
broadcast communication is considered, however, no ordering between processes is considered.
[IKWZ90] and [MNHT89] only consider process crashes prior to the start of the protocol, but
no crashes during protocol execution are taken into account. We consider processes to be able
to crash at any moment of time. In [DIM93] a LE protocol is constructed which tolerates
transient process failures. This protocol belongs to the category of self-stabilizing protocols
[Dij74]. This protocol, however, assumes a complete network topology and does not require
identities to be distinct.
Complexity Results
LE protocols vary in complexity. Early protocols for a ring network (as given in [CR79,
LeL77]) have a worst case message complexity of O(N
2
) and a worst case time complexity of
O(N), N being the number of participants in the election. Later on these results have been
improved (see e.g. [Pet82, vLT87]) to protocols with a message complexity of O(N logN) and
a time complexity of O(logN). For a complete network LE protocols have been designed with
a worst case message complexity of O(N logN) and a worst case time complexity of O(N),
see [AG91, Att87, KKM85, LMW86]. In [Sin91] a number of LE protocols for asynchronous
complete networks is given with a message complexity of O(Nk) and a time complexity of
O(N=k), with k a constant, logNkN .
Specication and Verication in Temporal Logic
Existing LE protocols are mainly focussed on reducing message and time complexity, scarcely
paying attention to problem specication and protocol verication. To our knowledge no
formal specication of the (dynamic) LE problem is published elsewhere. In order to correctly
design (and verify!) communication protocols such a formal specication is indispensable.
The specication and verication techniques we use are well-known for almost a decade:
protocol specication and verication using a combination of temporal logic [MP92] and state-
transition diagrams has been applied for a number of other protocols (see e.g.[Lam83, HO83,
SPE84]). However, the dynamic character of processes combined with a timeout mechanism
so as to detect the absence of a leader makes the specication and verication more complex
than traditionally considered communication protocols.
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Specication and Validation in Process Algebra
Many simple existing communication protocols have been specied and veried in ACP, see
[Bae90] for examples. Such verications imply many algebraic computations on process ex-
pressions, showing that the specied protocol has the required (external) behaviour. However,
more complex protocols (like the leader election protocols in this paper) are too large for
manual algebraic verication. These protocols can be validated by simulation runs of their
behaviour. To this extent a protocol is translated to the executable formalism PSF[MV90],
which is strongly related to ACP. See [MV93] for examples of protocol specication using
PSF.
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3 Design and Complexity Analysis of LE Protocols
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Communication
Processes communicate with each other by exchanging messages via a broadcast network
like Ethernet [MB76]. A broadcast message sent by some process p is received instanta-
neously by all processes except p itself. In contrast with a multi-process rendez-vous in
which several processes synchronize on a common communication, broadcasting is consid-
ered to be asynchronous. Broadcast messages are buered by processes (so-called buered
broadcast [Geh84]). This buering is order preserving. In this paper the only form of commu-
nication we consider between processes is broadcasting. Therefore, we often omit the prex
broadcast in terms like message, communication, and so on.
It is assumed that the communication network is perfect, that is, no duplication, loss or
garbling of messages takes place. In this way we abstract from the design of a reliable
broadcast facility on a faulty network and simply assume the existence of such a protocol
(see e.g. [SGS84]). In order to avoid interference of transmissions of dierent processes it is
assumed that at most one message may be transmitted via the network at any moment of
time.
The ability of broadcasting communication is often treated as a special feature of the commu-
nication network. As a result, existing notations for concurrent (and distributed) processes
|like CSP [Hoa85], Estelle [BD87], and so on| do not provide a primitive by which a process
can explicitly broadcast a message. Here we consider broadcasting as part of our description
language (see also [Geh84]).
3.1.2 Protocol Description Language
We denote our protocol by a Finite State Machine (FSM) diagram [vB78], also called state
transition diagram. Transitions consist of an (optional) guard and zero or more actions.
Depending on the guard a transition is either enabled or disabled. In a state the process selects
non-deterministically between all enabled transitions, it performs the actions associated with
the selected transition (in arbitrary order) and goes to the next state. When there are no
enabled transitions the process remains in the same state. Evaluation of a guard, taking a
state transition and executing its associated actions constitute a single atomic event.
A message consists of a message type and one or more parameters. m(p
1
; : : : ; p
n
) denotes a
message of type m with parameters p
1
through p
n
. The sending of this message is denoted by
!!m(p
1
; : : : ; p
n
). At execution of the send statement by process p, say, the message is buered
instantaneously at each process except p. Since broadcasting is asynchronous, execution of
!!m(: : :) is never delayed due to unreadiness of a receiving process. (Notice that this means
that a process must always be able to buer a message received via the network.) Execution of
??m(: : :) by a process delays that process until a message of typem is delivered. Messages sent
by !!m(: : :) can be received only by ??m(: : :), so corresponding input and output actions must
aect the same message type and the same number of parameters (and the same parameter
types). Communications can be viewed as (possibly delayed) distributed assignments, that is,
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for processes p and q, variables x
i
and expressions E
i
(0<in) execution of !!m(E
1
; : : : ; E
n
)
in p and ??m(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) in q establishes the multiple assignment x
1
; : : : ; x
n
:= E
1
; : : : ; E
n
(in
q).
Guards are boolean expressions. We allow receive actions to appear in guards. This part of
a guard is true only when execution of the receive action causes no delay, that is, when the
corresponding message is at the head of the process' buer. An absent guard denotes a guard
that is always true.
When in a certain state a message type is received for which no corresponding transition is
present this is considered to be an error. This situation is called unspecied reception and
leads to a deadlock of the system.
A process consists of a buer process taking care of buering messages received via the
communication network, and a `main' process. The buer processes are left implicit|they
operate according to the rst-in rst-out principle, and are at any moment of time ready to
accept an input of the network and to oer an earlier received message to the main process.
A main process is denoted by a FSM and the co-operation of these processes is considered to
be the parallel composition of these FSMs. The reader should bear in mind that all processes
in our system are equivalent (apart from their identity). Thus the system is the parallel
composition of a number of equivalent FSMs. The individual FSMs co-operate by exchanging
messages in the way described above. The parallel composition is based on a fair interleaving
semantics where each process gets its turn innitely often. Furthermore, a transition has to
be taken eventually when it is continuously enabled (`weak fairness' [MP92]).
3.1.3 Introduction to Temporal Logic
For our formulation of the requirements of our protocol and the subsequent verication that
our protocol meets these requirements we use a rst-order temporal logic based on the tempo-
ral operators U and S (see also [MP92]). An extensive introduction to the use of temporal
logic for communication protocols can be found in [Got92].
A temporal formula is constructed from predicates, boolean operators (such as : and ^ ) and
temporal operators like 2 (pronounce `always'), 3 (`eventually'), U (`until'), W (`unless'),
 (`next'), (`always in the past'), (`some time in the past'), S (`since') and J (`just').
Let ' and  be arbitrary temporal formulas. We consider the future (and the past) in a
strict sense, that is, the current moment is excluded. Informally speaking, 2' means that '
will be true at every moment in the future. 3' means that ' will be true at some moment
in the future, and ' U  means that  will become true eventually and that ' will be true
continuously until that moment. 'W  means that either ' holds indenitely or ' U  
holds (weak until). ' means that ' holds at the next moment in time (our time domain is
discrete since we use sequences, see below). The temporal operators which refer to the past
are informally dened as follows. ' means that ' has been true at every moment in the
past, ' means that ' has been true at some moment in the past, and nally, ' S  means
that  has been true at some moment in the past and that ' has been true continuously
since that moment. J ' means that ' has just become true. At each moment of time the
predicate true holds. Predicate false equivales : true.
The formal semantics of our form of temporal logic is dened by interpreting temporal for-
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mulas in a model. We consider a (possibly innite) sequence s of states (s
0
; s
1
; : : : ; s
n
; : : :)
starting from the initial state s
0
. A model is a sequence s together with a valuation function
V assigning a subset of states to each predicate (giving the states in which the predicate is
true). Given a model (s; V ), the meaning of temporal formulas is dened by a satisfaction
relation (denoted by j=) between the model and the current state (represented by its number
in s), and a temporal formula. This satisfaction relation holds if and only if the formula
is true in that state in that model. For s=(s
0
; s
1
; : : : ; s
n
; : : :) and ';  arbitrary temporal
formulas, j= is dened as follows:
s; V; n j= P i s
n
2 V (P ) for each predicate P
s; V; n j= :' i s; V; n 6j= '
s; V; n j= '^ i s; V; n j= ' and s; V; n j=  
s; V; n j= ' U  i there exists m > n such that s; V;m j=  and
s; V; i j= ' for all i with n < i < m
s; V; n j= ' S  i there exists m with 0  m < n such that s; V;m j=  and
s; V; i j= ' for all i with m < i < n .
In our requirements (section 3.2.1 below) and our verication (section 4), all formulas should
be interpreted to hold for all states (i.e. 8n : n0). The semantics of the remaining temporal
operators can now be dened for arbitrary ' and  as follows:
3'  true U '
2'  :3 :'
'  false U '
'W   2' _ ' U  
'  true S '
'  : :'
J '  ' ^ :' S :' .
Predicate I characterizes the initial state (i.e., n=0) and is equivalent to : (true S true).
As usual the unary operators bind stronger than the binary ones. The temporal operators
S , U , and W bind equally strong and take precedence over ^ , _ , and ) . ) binds
weaker than ^ and _ , and ^ and _ bind equally strong.
3.2 A First Stepping Stone
In this section we design a leader election protocol assuming that a leader process is present
initially and processes do not crash. We start by dening the precise requirements of the
problem.
3.2.1 Requirements in Temporal Logic
The formulation of the requirements is as abstract as possible, that is, without reference to
a possible protocol. In particular we refrain from mentioning certain states of the protocol.
We only use a predicate leader(i) which represents the fact that the process with identity i
is the current leader. This identity i is part of a countable set Id totally ordered by <. We
use i; j; k to denote elements of Id.
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In our requirements we use quantication over Id. We stress that this quantication should
be interpreted in a restricted way in the sense that not all identications are involved in
this quantication (the whole set Id) but only those identications corresponding to the
processes actually participating at that moment (so, always a nite subset of Id). We could
have made this explicit by introducing an auxiliary predicate participating and replacing
every universal quantication (8 i :: : : :) by (8 i : participating(i) : : : :) and replacing every
existential quantication (9 i :: : : :) by (9 i : participating(i) : : : :). For ease of notation we
have left this intended form of quantication implicit.
The requirements for the protocol are as follows. The most basic requirement states that
there must always be at most one leader (since a change of leadership may take some time
there can be temporarily no leader at all).
P1 : (9 i :: leader(i) ) (8 j : i 6= j : : leader(j))) .
If we just take the above requirement we can easily devise a protocol by just not electing a
leader at all. We should also state that there will be `enough' leaders in due time. Because
we are working in a framework using a qualitative notion of time this should be formulated
by the liveness requirement below that there will be innitely often a leader (this does not
imply that there will be innitely many leaders).
P2 : 3 (9 i :: leader(i)) .
The last two requirements make sense of the order < on Id. The idea is that processes with
a higher identity have priority in being elected as leader over processes with a lower identity.
P3 states that a leader in the presence of a process with a higher identity will capitulate
eventually (we do not state anything about the possible future leadership of this `better'
process)
1
.
P3 : (8 i :: leader(i) ^ (9 j : i < j : : leader(j)) ) 3 : leader(i)) .
The last requirement states that the next leader will be an improvement over the previous
one (i.e., will have a higher identity).
P4 : (8 i; j :: leader(i) ^  : leader(i)
^ (8k :: : leader(k)) U leader(j) ) i < j) ,
where we refer to the last moment of leadership of process i (rst two conjuncts in premise)
and the moment of succession of process j (third conjunct).
The last two requirements impose constraints on the capitulation of a leader process and the
ordering of its successor. Note that P4 implies that a process that capitulates once, will not
become a leader any more.
3.2.2 A First Protocol
In this section we construct a LE protocol starting from requirements P1 through P4. To keep
the design manageable it is assumed that a leader is present initially and all other processes
are `asleep'.
1
Note that the assumption that j is no leader is superuous in light of P1. We have added this assumption
because we think the formulation of P3 is more clear in this way.
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Each process has a xed unique identity. Initially processes only have their own identity at
their disposal (my id) and have no knowledge of other processes' identities. The processes
that do not yet take part in the election decide |non-deterministically| whether to join the
election or not. Thus, a subset of all processes actually takes part in the election.
Initially a process does not know the identity of the leader, and, consequently it can not
decide whether it becomes a leader or not. Once the identity of the leader is known there are
two possible outcomes: the process should become (the new) leader or not. From the above
we conclude that a process may be in one of the following possible states: candidate, when it
does not yet know whether it will become a leader or not, leader when it actually is a leader,
and failed when it is defeated. A process starts in the start state.
Once a process joins the election, that is, when it becomes a candidate, it transmits its
identity my id by means of an I(my id) (Identify) message. On receipt of an identity a
leader compares this identity with its own identity. In case the received id is larger than its
own id the leader moves to the failed state (there is a `better' process), and gives the candidate
the right of succession by transmitting the candidate's id with an R-message (Response). In
the other case, the leader remains leader and transmits its own id using R(my id). The
actions of a candidate on receipt of an identity follow quite straightforward|when it receives
an R-message with its own id it becomes a leader, when it receives an R-message with a larger
id it becomes failed, and otherwise it remains a candidate.
There is however a little aw in the above informally described protocol: when two (or more)
processes are in the candidate state and one of them causes the leader to capitulate (i.e., to
become failed) the rest of the candidates may not receive a response of the leader, remaining
candidate forever. This problem is resolved by letting a candidate (re-)transmit its own id
on receipt of an R(id) message with id<my id. We thus obtain the following protocol (see
Figure 1).
Some notational remarks are in order. States are represented by rounded boxes and transitions
are denoted by arrows. The operator & should be read as \such that". Transition labels
consist of an optional guard and an optional set of actions separated by a horizontal straight
line. The initial state is indicated by having a grey color.
Notice that we deliberately have chosen to permit the leader process only to deal with suc-
cession inquiries. This is accomplished by distinguishing between messages originated by the
leader and those originated by candidates. When both the leader and candidates transmit
their identities by the same message type one should realize that candidates may force other
candidates to become failed which may cause violation of P2. This can be seen as follows.
Consider the following scenario of three processes, p, q, and r, one of which is a leader, r,
say. Assume p and q do not take part in the election yet. Let p>q>r. Suppose q joins the
election by transmitting its identity. Since p is still in the start state it ignores q's id. Before
r reacts on the receipt of q's id, p joins the election and transmits its id. This will force q
to become failed. As r capitulates (due to q's id received earlier) and as q will not become
its successor (due to p's id) no process is able to grant p the right of succession, and, conse-
quently, no leader process will ever be elected. The problem is that a candidate may not only
be forced to become failed by the leader process, but also by other candidates. Therefore, we
distinguish between id's originating from candidates and those submitted by leader processes.
Candidates become either failed or leader only on receipt of messages from leaders and they
ignore others. In the above example q will thus not become failed on receipt of p's id.
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Start
Candidate
Failed Leader
??I(id) & id < my_id
!!R(my_id)
??I(id) & id > my_id
!!R(id)
??R(id) & id > my_id
??I(id)
______
!!I(my_id)
??R(id) & id < my_id
t rt??R(id)
_______
_________
??I(id)
______
??I(id)
______
??R(my_id)
__________
__________________
!!I(my_id)
__________________
??R(id)
_______
_________________
__________________
Figure 1: Finite state machine diagram of Protocol 1.
3.3 A Symmetric LE Protocol
We now drop the unnatural assumption of a leader being present initially. In this section we
design a LE protocol starting from the previous protocol in case no leader may be present
initially. As in the previous section processes are considered to be perfect and the protocol
has to be consistent with respect to requirements P1 through P4.
Let us rst remark that in the current setting Protocol 1 does not suce as it does not satisfy
P2|no leader will ever be present in case a leader is absent initially. The problem now is
that a candidate must be able to detect the absence of a leader.
A straightforward approach to detect the absence of a leader is to equip each process with
a timer process and to detect the absence of a leader by means of a timeout mechanism. A
timer is started by the start-timer action. A timeout is modeled as an ordinary action and
may be used as (part of) a guard. In contrast to ordinary guards, timeout actions can be
used to detect the establishment of a global condition in a protocol. They are abstract in the
sense that they do not describe how the occurrence of this global condition can be detected
using a kind of clock mechanism. A similar treatment of timeout actions is recently given in
[Gou93].
The idea now is that a process starts its timer when it becomes a candidate. When receiving
a response of the leader on its initial I(my id) message the timer plays no role and the process
progresses as in the rst protocol. In absence of a response of a leader, the candidate goes
to the leader state at the occurrence of a timeout. Thus, a timeout guard must be disabled
in case a leader is present. This leader process might be the leader at the start of the timer,
but might also be a `fresh' one. Therefore, a timeout guard is dened to be true (the timer
expires) only when a process has received and processed all responses to its message sent
at starting the timer. This timeout mechanism is usually called non-premature. A precise
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characterization of the timeout mechanism is given in section 4. We thus obtain the protocol
as depicted in Figure 2(a).
Recall that the reason for introducing two dierent messages types to exchange identities
in Protocol 1 was to avoid the violation of P2. We observe that |due to the timeout
mechanism| this problem does no longer occur. Therefore, there is no objection against
replacing the response messages by I-messages. This results in the protocol as depicted in
Figure 2(b). As a consequence, candidates can now be forced to become failed by receiving
messages from other candidates. In Protocol 1 a candidate only reacts to messages sent by
the leader.
timeout
_______
Start
Candidate
Failed Leader
??I(id) & id < my_id
!!R(my_id)
??I(id) & id > my_id
!!R(id)
??R(id) & id > my_id
??I(id)
______
??R(id) & id < my_id
tart??R(id)
_______
??I(id)
______
??I(id)
______
??R(my_id)
__________
__________________
!!I(my_id)
__________________
??R(id)
_______
_________________
__________________
timeout
_______
Start
Candidate
Failed Leader
??I(id) & id < my_id
!!I(my_id)
??I(id) & id > my_id
!!I(id)
??I(id) & id > my_id
??I(id)
______
!!I(my_id) ; start_timer
??I(id) & id < my_id
tart
___________________
??I(my_id)
__________
__________________
!!I(my_id)
__________________
??I(id)
_______
_________________
__________________
!!I(my_id) ; start_timer
___________________
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Finite state machine diagrams of two derivates of Protocol 1.
Some signicant simplications to the latter protocol can be made. Observe that there are
two possible transitions from the candidate state to the leader state, one of which may take
place when no leader is present (labelled with a timeout guard). The other transition is
enabled on receipt of an I(my id) message which is only sent when a leader capitulates. It is
not hard to see that the protocol's correctness is not aected by the removal of this message
transmission. So, in that case a leader moves without any notication to the failed state on
receipt of a larger id than its id. This implies that one of the transitions to the leader state
will never be enabled and, hence, may safely be eliminated. Thus we obtain the protocol
depicted in Figure 3, referred to as \Protocol 2".
3.4 A Fault-Tolerant LE Protocol
In this section we drop the assumption of perfect processes and revise our earlier designs
by considering processes that cease participation without notifying other processes. After
halting a process does not behave maliciously. This kind of failures is known as crash faults
(see e.g. [Fis91]). Crashed processes may recover and (re-)join at any time. It is assumed
that recovered processes restart in the start state. This should not be confused with \self-
stabilizing" systems [Dij74, Sch93] where processes may recover in any state. The number of
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timeout
_______
Start
Candidate
Failed Leader
??I(id) & id < my_id
!!I(my_id)
??I(id) & id > my_id
??I(id) & id > my_id
??I(id)
______
!!I(my_id) ; start_timer
??I(id) & id < my_id
rt
___________________
__________________
!!I(my_id)
__________________
??I(id)
_______
_________________
__________________
Figure 3: Finite state machine diagram of Protocol 2.
times a process can crash or recover during an election is unlimited. A process cannot crash
during the execution of an atomic event.
Recall the requirements as specied in section 3.2.1. Since the assumptions about process
behaviour are now strongly modied it needs to be checked whether the initial requirements
are still realistic. For instance, it is rather unrealistic to require P2 bearing in mind that all
processes may crash eventually. We, therefore, rst reformulate the requirements.
3.4.1 Requirements Revisited
It is still essential that at any moment of time there is at most one leader:
Q1 : (9 i :: leader(i) ) (8 j : i 6= j : : leader(j))) .
In order to distinguish between our initial requirements P1 through P4 and the new ones we
label new requirements with Q. Again, all quantications implicitly range over the processes
actually participating at that moment|including crashed processes.
As stated above, it is unrealistic to demand P2 since potentially all processes may fail. We
therefore only claim P2 in case there exists a process at some time which will denitely not
crash from then on and for which all better processes have (and remain) crashed. Predicate
dead(i) indicates the fact that process i has crashed. Formally,
Q2 : 3 (9 i :: 2 (:dead(i) ^ (8 j : i < j : dead(j))) ) ) 23 (9 i :: leader(i)) .
Quite evidently, a crashed process can not act as a leader process (and vice versa).
Q3 : (8 i :: : (leader(i) ^ dead(i))) .
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The next requirement addresses the question in what circumstances a leader capitulates.
Well, a leader should be the process with the highest identity among all living participating
processes. This implies that a leader should capitulate as soon as there is some other (living)
process which is an improvement. However, when this better process crashes the above claim
is too strong. We, therefore, require the following weakened variant of P3:
Q4 : (8 i; j :: leader(i) ^ : dead(j) ^ i < j ) 3 : leader(i) _ 3 dead(j)) .
When a leader capitulates this may be caused by either the crash of this process or the fact
that there was a better (living) process. Formally,
Q5 : (8 i :: J : leader(i) ) dead(i) _ (9 j : i < j : : dead(j))) .
Both Q4 and Q5 refer to the capitulation of a leader. It remains to require something about
the succession of leaders. Previously we required that leaders must be succeeded by better
ones. This claim is still valid. However, it needs a more careful formulation, since, it is
invalid in case, for instance, a leader capitulates by crashing. It, therefore, seems reasonable
to require
Q6 : (8 i; j :: leader(i) ^  : leader(i)
^ ((8 k :: : leader(k)) ^ : dead(i)) U leader(j) ) i  j) .
Informally formulated: given some leader process, i say, its immediate successor, process j, is
not less qualied than i provided that i does not crash in between the leaderships of i and j.
Q6 thus claims nothing about the relation between a leader and its successor when the leader
crashes in the meanwhile. Furthermore, crashes of other processes do not have any inuence.
Notice that a leader may be succeeded by itself as it may capitulate due to the presence of a
better candidate that crashes before becoming a leader.
We may consider Q2 and Q4 as weakened variants of P2 and P3 respectively. This weakening
is needed since we now allow crashes. The relationship between Q6 and P4 is more subtle.
When processes may not crash Q6 boils down to the corresponding
(8 i :: leader(i) ) 2 (8 j :: leader(j) ) i  j)) .
This requirement, however, in the context of the previous protocols allows a leader to capit-
ulate (in presence of a better candidate, cf. P3), become a leader again, capitulate (there is
still a better candidate), and so on, in a repetitive way. In case processes do not crash this
is |in our opinion| not desirable as no real progress is made: when a leader capitulates
due to the presence of a better candidate one expects that at some time a new (and better)
leader emerges. Therefore, P4 was introduced. For Protocol 3 this situation is dierent as
each process, including candidates, may crash spontaneously. Thus a leader may capitulate
because a better candidate is noticed, but before this candidate becomes a leader it crashes.
Then it must be allowed that the capitulated leader becomes a leader again. This leads us to
Q6.
3.4.2 Design of a Fault-Tolerant Protocol
We take the previous protocol as a starting point for our design of a fault-tolerant LE protocol.
The crucial point now is that in absence of a leader after it crashes, a failed process might be
a valid successor.
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So as to involve failed processes in the election we consider two cases. First, to avoid a
candidate to become a leader in case a leader crashed and a better failed process is present,
failed processes become a candidate on receipt of an I-message with a smaller id than their
own id|thus joining the competition about the leadership and thus avoiding violation of Q4.
Other I-messages are still ignored when being failed. It should be observed that this does not
suce in case a leader crashes, at least one failed process is present (that will never crash),
and no candidate will ever appear. In this scenario no leader will ever be elected, although
there is some process that will never crash. This violates Q2. Therefore, we should have a
mechanism via which failed processes will rejoin the election in absence of a leader. Several
techniques can be applied to accomplish this
2
. Here we abstract from a specic technique and
model this by adding a transition labelled with an absent guard from failed to the candidate
state, such that a failed process may (re-)join the election spontaneously by identifying itself
and starting its timer
3
.
Start
Candidate
Failed Leader
??I(id) & id < my_id
!!I(my_id)
??I(id) & id > my_id
??I(id) & id > my_id
??I(id)
__________
!!I(my_id) ;
start_timer
timeout
??I(id)
& id < my_id
!!I(my_id);
StartDead ______
??I(id)
_______
_________________
____________
_________________
??I(id) & id < my_id
!!I(my_id)
_________________
_________________
??I(id) & id > my_id
_________________
_____
start_timer
start_timer
!!I(my_id) ;
__________
Figure 4: Finite state machine diagram of Protocol 3.
We model the fact that processes may crash at arbitrary times by a possible transition from
each possible state to a new state, named dead state. We denote these transitions by dotted
arrows. The dierence between transitions represented by dotted, respectively solid, arrows
should be interpreted as follows. In case of a dotted arrow the transition is always possible
2
For instance, a leader may transmit on a regular basis \I am here" messages and in absence of such
messages a timeout could expire in a failed process, thus forcing it to become starting (or candidate). Another
possibility would be to let a failed process regularly check whether a leader is present (see e.g. [GZ86]).
3
It should be noted that we now have two transitions with equivalent actions, one of which has a true guard
from the failed state to the candidate state. These transitions can not be combined into a single transition with
a true guard as it would then be no longer guaranteed that this transition is made on receipt of an I-message
with an identity larger than that of the recipient: a process may then perform the transition whenever it likes.
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(and hence can be non-deterministically chosen), but not necessary (that is, it can be ignored
indenitely). On the other hand, a solid arrow represents a necessary transition, that is, a
transition that eventually has to be taken whenever it is continuously enabled. Representing
crash transitions by solid arrows would imply that all processes crash eventually which is
rather unnatural. The dotted arrows and solid arrows are similar to the modal relations
 !
3
, respectively  !
2
of modal transition systems (see e.g. [LT88]).
Similarly, the fact that processes may recover spontaneously after crashing is modeled by a
(dotted) transition from the dead to the start state. This yields the protocol depicted in
Figure 4, called \Protocol 3". For the sake of brevity, transition labels are omitted when
both its associated guard and set of actions are absent.
3.5 Complexity Analysis of the Protocols
3.5.1 Introduction
Much work has been devoted in literature on designing ecient LE protocols. In general, the
following complexity measures are considered: message complexity (the number of messages
needed to elect a leader), time complexity (the number of time units needed to elect a leader)
and bit complexity (the number of bits in a message). The bit complexity of all presented
protocols is O(logN), where N is the total number of processes. For Protocol 1 we remark
that the time complexity is equal to the message complexity.
In this section we analyze the worst case message complexity of our protocols. In our protocols
all messages are broadcasted, so each message is received by all processes (except the sender).
In a dynamic broadcast protocol, with processes starting up during protocol execution, each
process at least has to send one (initial) message to the other processes so as to present itself,
so the message complexity is at least O(N). Due to the dynamic character of the protocol
each message needs an answer. If each process answers each message that has been received
so far by sending a new message, we may expect a worst case message complexity exponential
to N .
3.5.2 Complexity of Protocol 1
The following theorem holds for the message complexity of Protocol 1, where MC
q
1
(N; i)
represents the number of messages sent by N processes participating in the election, process
i being the initial leader. For reasons of simplicity an identity is represented by a positive
natural number.
Theorem 3.1 MC
q
1
(N; i) =
1
2
N
2
+
1
2
N  
1
2
i
2
+
3
2
i  2.
Proof: Each process that becomes a candidate sends an initial I-message. For all processes
k with k<i this message will be answered by a message R(m) with m>k, which will bring
process k to the failed state. From this state no messages are sent, so these i 1 processes
each contribute 1 message to MC
q
1
(N; i). In the worst case scenario process i sends i 1
R-messages in reaction on these I-messages.
In the worst case scenario all processes k with k>i send their initial I-message, with I(i+1)
rst, and become candidate before the initial leader replies with its (nal) message R(i+1).
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Thus process i+1 becomes the new leader. But R(i+1) also evokes an I-message from all
candidate processes with an id greater than i+1. If these messages are sent with I(i+2) rst,
the whole story repeats itself, until nally process N becomes leader. In each \round" the
number of participants is reduced by one and the number of reactions on an R-message is
maximal. So the scenario described above indeed is the worst case.
Process k (i<kN) receives k 1 R-messages before it becomes leader. The ids of the rst
k 2 R-messages are smaller than k, so k 2 times an I(k)-message is sent from the candidate
state. The id of the last R-message is equal to k, which makes k the new leader. All processes,
except the nal leader, will send an R-message when they capitulate. Together with the initial
I-message this leads to a total number of k transmitted messages for processes i<k<N and
N 1 transmitted messages for process N .
The total number of messages for all processes now becomes
MC
q
1
(N; i) = (
P
i 1
k=1
1) + i+ (
P
N
k=i+1
k)  1 =
1
2
N
2
+
1
2
N  
1
2
i
2
+
3
2
i  2 2
One can easily infer that the worst case message complexity is reached for i=1 or i=2 and is
equal to
1
2
N
2
+
1
2
N 1. Contrary, if process N is the initial leader we getMC
q
1
(N;N) = 2N 2.
So, in that case the message complexity reduces to O(N). Figure 5 illustrates the worst case
behaviour of Protocol 1 for N = 4; i = 1. Each I-message and R-message is subscripted with
either an i (initial message) or a number k, indicating that this message is a reaction on the
k-th message transmitted so far. We suppose that a local buer is empty at the moment the
initial message is sent.
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4
3
2
1
1 5 10 15
I(2)
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I(4)
7
R(4)
8
Figure 5: Worst case behaviour of Protocol 1 with queueing.
The message complexity of O(N
2
) can be improved signicantly by the idea of `smart' buer-
ing. According to this principle messages are buered depending on their parameter: at each
moment of time a process buer only contains the I-message with the largest id received upon
then, but not processed until so far. In this way a buer contains at most one I-message at a
time. Adopting this tricky buering mechanism to Protocol 1, reduces the message complexity
to O(N), independent of the initial leader:
Theorem 3.2 MC
s
1
(N) = 2N   2.
Proof: Buering of several initial I-messages now leads to a single R-message to the process
with the highest id, which makes this process the new leader and forces the other processes
to the failed state. Worst case protocol behaviour is now observed if each initial message is
separately answered by an R-message. It does not matter which process is the initial leader or
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in which order the processes send their initial I-message. So, in the worst case 2(N 1)=2N 2
messages are needed. 2
Figure 6 shows this worst case behaviour, with the component with the highest id as the
initial leader.
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i
R(4)
5
Figure 6: Worst case behaviour of Protocol 1 with smart buering.
3.5.3 Complexity of Protocol 2
Compared to Protocol 1 we may expect a worse message complexity, because in the candidate
state each reception of an I-message with a lower id evokes the transmission of a new I-
message. In Protocol 1 only the reception of an R-message evoked a new message in the
candidate state.
We assume that all processes are in the start state. The worst case message complexity of
this protocol is observed when all processes send their initial I-message within a short time
interval. To put it in a more quantitative way: all participating processes send their initial
I-message within a time interval that is smaller than the timeout interval of a timer in the
candidate state. We will also suppose that a process starts with an empty local buer, local
history begins at the moment the initial I-message is sent.
Figure 7 shows the worst case behaviour of Protocol 2 for N=4.
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Figure 7: Worst case behaviour of Protocol 2 with simple buering.
With simple buering (queueing of all incoming messages) we obtain a complexity exponential
to N , whereas for smart buering this reduces to O(N). This is stated in the following
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theorems.
Theorem 3.3 MC
q
2
(N) = 2
N
  1.
Proof: By induction on N . If N=1 only one initial message is sent, so MC
q
2
(1) = 1. Now
suppose MC
q
2
(N   1) = 2
N 1
  1. In the worst case scenario initial I-messages are sent in
order of decreasing ids. After the transmission of its initial message process N will rst buer
the other N 1 initial messages and all replies from processes 2 : : : N 1 before it replies by
sending an I-message to each of them separately. So we get MC
q
2
(N) = 2MC
q
2
(N 1)+1 =
2(2
N 1
 1)+1 = 2
N
 1. 2
Theorem 3.4 MC
s
2
(N) = 2N   1.
Proof: Each process transmits an initial I-message. In the worst case all processes except
the future leader will have to be brought to the failed state by a separate I-message from a
process with a higher id. So N +N   1 = 2N   1 messages are needed. 2
Figure 8 shows a worst case behaviour of Protocol 2 with smart buering for 4 components.
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Figure 8: Worst case behaviour of Protocol 2 with smart buering.
3.5.4 Complexity of Protocol 3
First we consider an election without crashing processes. With `simple' buering, the worst
case message complexity of Protocol 3 is the same as for Protocol 2. With smart buering
the message complexity increases to O(N
2
). This is stated in the following theorems.
Theorem 3.5 MC
q
3
(N) = 2
N
  1.
Proof: See Protocol 2. Compared to Protocol 2, there are more situations in which the worst
case behaviour occurs. A process that wakes up from the failed state may evoke messages
from processes with a higher id. 2
Theorem 3.6 MC
s
3
(N) =
1
2
N
2
+
1
2
N .
Proof: An initial I-message from a process with a lower id causes a transition from the failed
state to the candidate state for a process with a higher id. This transition is accompanied
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by the transmission of an I-message. If a leader with a higher id is already present, an extra
message is needed to put the process back to the failed state again. This leads to a worst
case message complexity of
P
N
i=1
i =
1
2
N
2
+
1
2
N . 2
Figure 9 shows an example of the worst case behaviour of Protocol 3 with 4 components
initially in the start state.
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Figure 9: Worst case behaviour of Protocol 3 with smart buering.
Finally we analyze the complexity in case K processes crash (0K<N). Many complex
scenarios are possible, dependent on what moment during an election a process crashes. For
simplicity, we assume that crashed processes do not recover and failed processes only return
spontaneously to the candidate state when a leader is actually absent. The worst case scenario
occurs when K processes crash after the initial election has been completed (i.e., process N
is leader and all other processes are failed).
Protocol buer MC
1 queue
1
2
N(N + 1)   1
1 smart 2N   2
2 queue 2
N
  1
2 smart 2N   1
3 queue 2
N
  1
3 smart
1
2
N(N + 1)
Table 1: Overview of worst case message complexities of all protocols.
The worst case message complexity involving the crash of K out of N participating processes
is given by
Theorem 3.7 MC
c
3
(N;K) =
1
6
K
3
 
1
2
NK
2
+ (
1
2
N
2
 
1
6
)K.
Proof: The worst case scenario is as follows: the leader (process N) crashes, and failed
processes become candidate in decreasing order of ids. This leads to a new election with
N 1 processes. From Theorem 3.6 we know that this requires
P
N 1
i=1
i messages. If this
scenario is repeated for the subsequent crashes of processes N 1; N 2; : : : ; N K+1, we get
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MC
c
3
(N;K) =
P
K
k=1
(
P
N k
i=1
i). Elimination of the sum constructs leads to the result stated
above. 2
The results of this section are summarized in Table 1.
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4 Verication by Temporal Logic
4.1 Introduction
In the previous section we informally motivated our design decisions. In this section we
formally prove that the protocols designed in section 3 satisfy their requirements. That is, we
prove that Protocols 1 and 2 satisfy requirements P1 through P4 and Protocol 3 satises Q1
through Q6. We, furthermore, prove that for all three protocols unspecied receptions cannot
occur. We stress that we do not intend to give a completely formalized proof. Such a proof
is well possible, but however, requires a formalization of the assumptions, a transformation
of the protocols to our proof formalism (temporal logic), and so on, which would make the
proofs too much involved. We, therefore, conne ourselves to presenting only the main ideas
of the proof.
In the rest of this section we use the following notations and conventions. The fact of being
a leader, that is leader(i), is identied with the fact that process i is in the leader state. To
distinguish between the conceptual state of being a leader and the internal protocol states, L
i
is used to denote that i is in the leader state of the protocol. Similarly, predicates S
i
, C
i
, D
i
,
and F
i
denote that process i is in the start, candidate, dead or failed state, respectively. The
local buer of process i is symbolized by Q
i
. Assertion send
i
(m(p
1
; : : : ; p
n
)) is true (in some
state of the state sequence) only when process i executes !!m(p
1
; : : : ; p
n
) at leaving that state.
Similarly, assertion rcv
i
(m(p
1
; : : : ; p
n
)) is true if and only if guard ??m(p
1
; : : : ; p
n
) evaluates
to true and the corresponding transition is taken.
We rst formally dene some relevant assumptions about the broadcast mechanism. Let m,
m
1
, and m
2
be unique messages, that is, both their originator and moment of origination are
unique. (It has been shown in [Koy89] that messages need to be uniquely identiable so as
to specify communication mechanisms in temporal logic by axioms like those below.)
Assumption 4.1
(8 i :: send
i
(m) ) (8 j : i 6= j : 3rcv
j
(m)) ) .
Assumption 4.2
(8 i :: rcv
i
(m) ) (9 j : i 6= j : send
j
(m)) ) .
Assumption 4.3
(8 i; j :: send
i
(m
1
) ^ 3 send
j
(m
2
)
) (8 k : k 6= i^k 6= j : 3 (rcv
k
(m
1
) ^ 3rcv
k
(m
2
))) ) .
Assumption 4.1 states that messages are not lost by the communication network, 4.2 phrases
that messages are not spontaneously generated by the network, and 4.3 expresses that the
network is order-preserving. Observe that it immediately follows from 4.2 that a process does
not receive its own transmitted messages. That is, for all messages m
Property 4.4
(8 i :: rcv
i
(m) ) : send
i
(m)) .
23
4.2 Verication of Protocol 1
We now start with the proof of the correctness of Protocol 1. We deal with the requirements
one by one. As P4, stating that successive leaders are `better', is the crux to the proofs of P2
and P3, we present the proof of P4 after the proof of P1. The rst proof obligation is:
P1 : (9 i :: L
i
) (8 j : i 6= j : :L
j
)) .
Dene predicate Q as follows:
Q  N
l
+N
r
 1 ,
where N
l
is dened by (# i :: L
i
) and N
r
equals (# i :: R(i) 2 Q
i
). # denotes `number of'.
By denition, 0N
r
and 0N
l
. It immediately follows Q) P1.
Initially we have assumed
Assumption 4.5
I ) (N
l
= 1 ^ (8 i :: Q
i
= empty)) ,
which implies that Q holds initially. The rest of the proof concentrates on establishing
Lemma 4.6
Q ) 2Q .
From this lemma we may then conclude P1.
Proof: Assume Q holds. By denition Q can only be falsied when either N
l
or N
r
(or
both) increases. We consider an increase of either N
l
or N
r
by one. Later on we show that
considering these cases suces.
Consider an increase of N
r
by 1. So there is one process, j say, that buers an R(j) message.
We infer from the protocol description that only a leader process can transmit R-messages:
Property 4.7
(8 i; j :: send
i
(R(j)) ) L
i
) .
According to our denition of broadcasting a sender does not receive its own messages. So,
for process j to buer R(j), there must be another process, i say, which has transmitted this
message, and consequently (according to 4.7) L
i
holds at transmitting it. A leader i only
transmits R(j) (j 6=i) when it capitulates:
Property 4.8
(8 i; j : i 6= j : send
i
(R(j)) ) 2F
i
) .
Consequently, a leader transmits only once such a message. From the above, we may now
conclude that whenever N
r
is increased by one, N
l
must be decreased by one.
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Now consider an increase of N
l
by one. By a similar reasoning as above we prove that this
must be accompanied by a decrease of N
r
by one. First, it can be inferred from the protocol
description that process i can only become a leader after receipt of message R(i). This can
be formalized as follows
Property 4.9
(8 i :: :L
i
^ 2 :rcv
i
(R(i)) ) 2 :L
i
) .
Furthermore it is quite evident that process i can only perform rcv
i
(m), for some message
type m, by extracting m from Q
i
,
Property 4.10
(8 i :: rcv
i
(m) ) m 62 Q
i
) .
Considering R-messages the above implies that N
l
can only be increased by one after a
decrease of N
r
by one.
Since an increase of N
l
(N
r
) by one is coupled by a decrease of N
r
(N
l
) by one it follows
|given that 0  N
l
; N
r
 1| that considering the above two cases suces.
(End of proof P1.)
P4 : (8 i; j :: L
i
^  :L
i
^ (8k :: :L
k
) U L
j
) i < j) .
Proof: When a leader never capitulates P4 holds trivially. Consider the case that at some
time a leader will capitulate. Assume L
i
^  :L
i
^ (8 k :: :L
k
) U L
j
. According to 4.9 j
may only become a leader after receipt of R(j). Moreover, R-messages are only transmitted
by leader processes (see 4.7). The idea now is to show that process i must have transmitted
R(j), and i6=j. From the protocol description i<j may then be concluded, due to
Property 4.11
(8 i; j : i 6= j : send
i
(R(j)) ) i < j) .
The proof of P4 is as follows. It can easily be veried that i6=j since we have from the protocol
description
Property 4.12
(8 i :: L
i
^  :L
i
)  F
i
) ,
Property 4.13
(8 i :: F
i
) 2F
i
) ,
from which it immediately follows
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Lemma 4.14
(8 i :: L
i
^  :L
i
) 2 :L
i
) .
Furthermore, from the invariance of Q (see proof P1) we have
L
i
) :L
j
^ (8 k :: R(k) 62 Q
k
) .
So, either process i or some successor of imust have transmittedR(j). Since j is the immediate
successor of i, i must have sent R(j), and thus (see 4.11) i<j.
(End of Proof P4.)
P2 : 3 (9 i :: L
i
) .
Proof: Since initially there is one leader process P2 holds trivially when a leader never
capitulates. Therefore consider the case when at some time a leader capitulates. From the
protocol it immediately follows that a leader i transmits R(j) at capitulation (see 4.8). We
prove that once R(j) is transmitted j will become a leader sooner or later. Formally:
Lemma 4.15
(8 j :: R(j) 2 Q
j
) 3L
j
) .
We have from the protocol
Property 4.16
(8 j :: C
j
^ rcv
j
(R(j)) )  L
j
) .
Informally, a candidate j becomes a leader once it receives an R(j) message. By proving
Lemma 4.17
(8 j :: R(j) 2 Q
j
) 3 (C
j
^ rcv
j
(R(j))) ) ,
we may |using 4.16 ^ 4.17 ) 4.15| conclude 4.15. Since transmitted messages are always
received and processed at some time (see 4.1) we concentrate on proving that C
j
holds on
processing R(j). We have that a leader i only transmits R(j) after receipt of an I(j) message
with i<j. Or,
Property 4.18
(8 i; j :: 2 : (rcv
i
(I(j)) ^ i < j) ) 2 : send
i
(R(j)) ) .
Besides, only candidate and start processes may transmit I-messages.
Property 4.19
(8 j :: send
j
(I(j)) ) C
j
_ S
j
) .
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After sending I(j) a start process j becomes a candidate immediately,
Property 4.20
(8 j :: S
j
^ send
i
(I(i)) )  C
j
) .
A stronger variant of lemma 4.17 is now proven. A process j that receives R(j) at some time
remains candidate from sending I(j) until receipt of R(j). Formally,
Lemma 4.21
(8 j :: send
j
(I(j)) ^ 3rcv
j
(R(j)) ) C
j
U rcv
j
(R(j)) ) .
From the protocol we have that a candidate j only leaves the candidate state after receiving
R(i) with ji.
Property 4.22
(8 j :: C
j
^ 2 : (9 i : j  i : rcv
j
(R(i))) ) 2C
j
) .
We now prove
Lemma 4.23
(8 j :: 3rcv
j
(R(j)) ) : (9 k : j  k : rcv
j
(R(k))) U rcv
j
(R(j)) ) .
By contradiction. Assume that process j receives R(k) (jk) before receiving R(j). This is
impossible due to the following lemma.
Lemma 4.24
(8 i; j; k :: rcv
j
(R(i)) ^ 3rcv
j
(R(k)) ) (j = i) i < k ^ j 6= i) i  k)) .
It immediately follows that 4.24 implies 4.23. Informally, process j receives at most once
R(j), and moreover, for any process the parameters of received R-messages form an ascending
sequence. Lemma 4.24 can be proven as follows. It is already stated before that only leaders
transmit R-messages (see 4.7). A leader i transmits zero or more times R(i) followed by
(at most) one time R(j) (i<j). So, a single leader generates an ascending sequence of R-
messages. From P1 it follows that there is at most one leader at a time. We know from
P4 that subsequent leaders are increasing|leaders become `better'. We may now conclude
lemma 4.24 since processes do not receive their own transmitted messages (property 4.4).
(End of Proof P2.)
P3 : (8 i :: L
i
^ (9 j : i < j : :L
j
) ) 3 :L
i
) .
Proof: The remaining requirement to be proven is P3. The idea is to reformulate P3 in terms
of internal states of the protocol, using :L
j
 S
j
_ C
j
_ F
j
. Since failed processes remain
failed indenitely once they become failed (see property 4.13), and since failed processes are
`less' than leaders
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Lemma 4.25
(8 i; j :: L
i
^ F
j
) i > j) ,
we do not have to consider failed processes. Of course it remains to prove lemma 4.25. There
are only two possible transitions by which a process can become failed
Property 4.26
(8 j :: J F
j
) (L
j
^ (9 k : j < k : rcv
j
(I(k))) _
(C
j
^ (9k : j < k : rcv
j
(R(k))) ) .
Property 4.26 follows directly from the protocol description. Now consider each transition in
isolation. In case L
j
^  F
j
lemma 4.25 follows directly from the fact that, according to P4,
subsequent leaders will be better. In the other case j becomes failed on receipt of R(k), k>j.
From this reception we know that R(k) is transmitted some time ago (see 4.2). From lemma
4.15 we infer that k has (or will) become a leader. In case it has been or still is a leader 4.25
follows immediately from P4. From the invariance of Q (see proof of P1) and lemma 4.15 we
deduce that
Lemma 4.27
(8k :: R(k) 2 Q
k
) : (9 i :: L
i
) U L
k
) .
In case k is not yet a leader this lemma implies that it will be the next leader, from which
|again using P4| lemma 4.25 can be inferred. This concludes the proof of lemma 4.25.
We now continue the proof of P3. According to the fair semantics of transitions each process
in the start state will become a candidate eventually. Or,
Property 4.28
(8 i :: S
i
) 3C
i
) .
Therefore, it is sucient to consider the following variant of P3:
Lemma 4.29
(8 i :: L
i
^ (9 j : i < j : C
j
) ) 3 :L
i
) .
The proof of lemma 4.29 is as follows. We have
Property 4.30
(8 i :: S
i
) :C
i
U send
i
(I(i)) ) .
That is, a process transmits an I(i) message before becoming a candidate. The crucial
property now is
Lemma 4.31
(8 i :: L
i
^ (9 j : i < j : C
j
) ) 3 (9 k : i < k : rcv
i
(I(k))) ) ,
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and since a leader process i capitulates as soon as it receives I(k) (i<k) (see properties 4.8
and 4.18) we may conclude from lemmata 4.29 and 4.31 that P3 holds.
It remains, of course, to establish lemma 4.31. Assume L
i
^ (9 j : i<j : C
j
). For i the initial
leader the lemma follows quite straightforward. Let i not be the initial leader. Then i has
become a leader on receipt of R(i) (see property 4.9). Since messages are broadcasted and j
has not itself transmitted R(i), due to
Property 4.32
(8 i :: L
i
) 2 :C
i
) ,
j must have received R(i) (cf. assumption 4.1). Now we have two possibilities, either S
j
or
C
j
holds on receipt of R(i). In both cases j transmits I(j) eventually: in case of S
j
to reach
C
j
and in case of C
j
as a reaction on the receipt of R(i). In both cases process i will process
I(j) after it has processed R(i), so after i has become a leader.
(End of Proof P3.)
We have showed that the Protocol 1 satises P1 through P4, and, consequently, conforms
to our requirements. Recall that unspecied receptions lead to abnormal termination of the
protocol. So, our remaining proof obligation is to prove that unspecied receptions can not
occur. For Protocol 1 this boils down to proving that a leader can not receive R-messages.
This can easily be veried using that only leader processes transmit R-messages (property
4.7), that at most a single leader exists (P1), and the fact that processes do not receive their
own messages (property 4.4). This completes the proof of Protocol 1.
4.3 Verication of Protocol 2
The purpose of this section is to prove that Protocol 2 satises requirements P1 through P4,
and that no unspecied receptions can occur. We take a similar approach as in the previous
section. As P4 is the crux of the proofs of both P2 and P3 (as in Protocol 1), its proof is
presented just after the proof of P1.
4.3.1 Timeout Semantics
We rst introduce some additional notations. For some protocol state guard timeout
i
for
process i evaluates to true whenever i's timeout occurs and the corresponding transition is
taken. The semantics of the timeout mechanism were informally dened in section 3.3. In
order to facilitate a formal proof we formalize this semantics. This formalization is essential
so as to prove the invariance of P1 through P4.
We characterize in general terms, that is without reference to the protocol, a `non-premature'
timeout in a broadcast network. A timer is started at the transmission of message m, say.
This message has to be received (and processed) by all its recipients before the timer may
expire. Formally,
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Assumption 4.33
(8 i :: send
i
(m
p
) ) :timeout
p
i
W (8 j : i 6= j : rcv
j
(m
p
)) ) ,
where m
p
is a unique message. (It has been shown in [Koy89] that messages need to be
uniquely identiable in order to specify communication mechanisms in temporal logic by
axioms like 4.33. In this verication we accomplish this by numbering of the messages by
the sender. From the context the dependence on the identication of the sender is explicit,
so for simplicity this dependence is omitted.) Strictly speaking, the timeout assertion is
associated to m
p
, and as m
p
is unique, the occurrence of the timeout is considered to be
unique. When necessary this dependence on m
p
is explicitly indicated by referring to the
number p of m. In the sequel we use p, q as numbers of messages. As, in general, it is not
guaranteed that each process is capable of processing a message of type m in some state, we
use the W operator in stead of the U operator. In absence of unspecied receptions |as
in the presented protocols| we could equally well use the U operator.
Now, however, a timeout may be enabled without forcing the originator of m
p
to receive and
process all replies to m
p
. Let r
m
p
;j
be a reply to m
p
transmitted by process j. We then
additionally require
Assumption 4.34
(8 i :: timeout
p
i
) (8 j : i 6= j : r
m
p
;j
62 Q
i
)) ,
where it should be mentioned that processing a message and sending a reply to this message
is considered to constitute an atomic event
4
. For the protocol at hand we should substitute
I
p
(i) and I
q
(j) (i<j) for m
p
and r
m
p
;j
, respectively in 4.33 and 4.34.
The formal semantics of a non-premature timeout in broadcasting networks is now dened
by axioms 4.33 and 4.34. Summarizing, according to 4.33 all processes (except the sender)
receive m, process this message and, if appropriate, send a reply. These replies are forced to
be received and processed by the originator of m as phrased by 4.34.
4.3.2 Timeout Properties
In the previous section we characterized the non-premature timeout in a rather general con-
text. For the protocol at hand we have some properties which hold for the timeout mechanism.
These properties are directly derived from the protocol specications. As they are frequently
used in the verication we treat them separately.
The rst property states that a timeout can only occur for candidate processes (and not in
other states)
Property 4.35
(8 i :: timeout
i
) C
i
) .
4
This implies that a process must reply immediately on processing of a message and is not allowed to wait
arbitrarily long with replying. It can easily be veried that the presented protocols conform to this principle.
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Another property which is used (implicitly) during the verication is that a process is only
a candidate once. That is, once a process has left the candidate state it will never become a
candidate anymore. This is formulated by
Property 4.36
(8 i :: :C
i
^ C
i
) 2 :C
i
) .
Furthermore, once a process is in the candidate state and given that it performs a timeout
eventually it remains a candidate until this timeout happens,
Property 4.37
(8 i :: C
i
^ 3timeout
i
) C
i
U timeout
i
) .
Using that a candidate i becomes failed on receipt of I(j), i<j,
Property 4.38
(8 i :: C
i
^ (9 j : i < j : rcv
i
(I(j))) )  F
i
) ,
we conclude
Lemma 4.39
(8 i :: C
i
^ 3timeout
i
) : (9 j : i < j : rcv
i
(I(j))) U timeout
i
) .
Lemma 4.39 phrases that no I(j) message is received by process i (i<j) after entering the
candidate state until its timeout occurs (provided its timeout occurs at some time)|otherwise
process i would be forced to the failed state (see 4.38).
One can now infer from 4.33, 4.34, and 4.39 that process j can prevent the occurrence of the
timeout of another process, i say, by transmitting I(j) with i<j, as reply to the receipt of
I(i).
4.3.3 Proof of Requirements
We now start with proving the requirements one by one. The rst proof obligation is:
P1 : (9 i :: L
i
) (8 j : i 6= j : :L
j
)) .
Proof: From the protocol we immediately deduce that a process can only become a leader
after performing a timeout.
Property 4.40
(8 i :: 2 :timeout
i
) 2 :L
i
) .
Furthermore, we infer that on occurrence of a timeout a process becomes a leader immediately
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Property 4.41
(8 i :: timeout
i
)  L
i
) ,
and, after just becoming a leader the process has performed a timeout:
Property 4.42
(8 i :: J L
i
) timeout
i
) ,
The above three equations give the relation between performing a timeout and becoming a
leader.
The idea behind the proof is now as follows. We consider two dierent cases. In case no
leader is present we must prove that it is not possible that two (or more) processes perform
a timeout simultaneously, and consequently, become a leader at the same time. This follows
directly from the interleaving semantics of our protocol description language which prevents
processes to perform transitions, and thus timeouts, simultaneously. The second case we have
to consider is the case in which we have a (set of) leader(s) and a new leader appears. Then
the proof obligation is to establish that this may not give rise to more than one leader. In
the rest of the proof we focus our attention on the latter case.
From the above relation between a timeout and becoming a candidate it immediately follows
that it suces to prove
Lemma 4.43
(9 i :: timeout
i
) (8 j : i 6= j : :L
j
)) ,
According to property 4.35 a timeout can only occur when a process is in the candidate state.
Initially, all processes are in the start state. A process only becomes a candidate after sending
an I-message.
Property 4.44
(8 i :: 2 : send
i
(I(i)) ) 2 :C
i
) .
In our protocol timeout
p
i
is associated to the (initial) transmission of message I
p
(i). From
assumption 4.33 we infer that each process receives I
p
(i). The idea is to refer to the state of
the recipient, process j say, at the moment of processing this message and to deduce that,
for each possible state, this process j can not be a leader at the occurrence of timeout
i
.
Formally, we have:
Lemma 4.45
(8 i; j :: rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) :L
j
)) .
We now prove lemma 4.45 for each possible state of the recipient of I
p
(i), process j, given
that i becomes a leader once (i.e. 3timeout
p
i
). Implicitly we use that process i is still a
candidate when j receives I(i).
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Property 4.46
(8 i :: (9 j :: rcv
j
(I
p
(i))) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) C
i
) .
First, consider the case that j is failed. Once a process is failed it remains failed, and, hence
will never become a leader. Thus,
Property 4.47
(8 j :: F
j
) 2F
j
) .
Consequently,
Lemma 4.48
(8 i; j :: F
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) F
j
)) ,
which concludes the proof for failed processes.
Secondly, consider j to be either a leader or a candidate. Abbreviate C
j
_ L
j
by CL
j
. From
the protocol specication we directly infer
Property 4.49
(8 i; j :: CL
j
^ rcv
j
(I(i)) ) (j < i)  F
j
) ^ (j > i) send
j
(I(j))) ) .
Property 4.49 suggests a case analysis between j<i and j>i. Consider j>i and 3timeout
p
i
.
According to 4.49 j replies by sending I(j). According to 4.34 process i is forced to process
this message since I(j) is a reply to I
p
(i). But, as j>i this contradicts with 4.39. Hence, the
interesting case is j<i. Stated otherwise,
Lemma 4.50
(8 i; j :: CL
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) j < i) .
From 4.50, 4.49, and 4.47 we now deduce
Lemma 4.51
(8 i; j :: CL
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) F
j
)) ,
which concludes the proof for candidate and leader processes.
Finally, consider the case that j is in the start state at the moment of receipt of I(i). From
the protocol description it immediately follows that start processes ignore all messages
Property 4.52
(8 i :: S
i
^ rcv
i
(m
1
) ) : send
i
(m
2
) ^  S
i
) .
Distinguish between two cases. In the rst case we assume that j remains in the start state
until i's timeout occurs. This immediately implies that j is not a leader at the moment i's
timeout occurs, and consequently we have
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Lemma 4.53
(8 i; j :: S
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ S
j
U timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) S
j
)) .
In the second case we consider that j has left the start state after processing I(i) and before
i performs its timeout, that is : (S
j
U timeout
p
i
). According to
Property 4.54
(8 j :: S
j
^  :S
j
)  C
j
) ,
j has become a candidate and due to 4.44 must have sent I(j) in order to do so. According
to the broadcasting communication i will receive this message. As I(j) is not a reply on
I(i), process i is not forced to process this message before performing its own timeout. This
suggests the following case analysis. First, consider the case that i processes I(j) before
performing its timeout. According to 4.39 this implies that, given that i will perform its
timeout once, i>j. Due to 4.49 i replies by transmitting I(i), and as j is forced to wait for
this reply before becoming a leader it will not be able to perform its timeout (due to 4.39).
In the other case i processes I(j) after performing its timeout. But then, by denition j can
not be a leader too at the moment i performs its timeout as it is forced, according to 4.34 to
wait for the reply of i. So, we conclude
Lemma 4.55
(8 i; j :: S
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ : (S
j
U timeout
p
i
) ) 2 (timeout
p
i
) :L
j
)) .
Lemmata 4.53 and 4.55 directly imply
Lemma 4.56
(8 i; j :: S
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) :L
j
)) .
From lemmata 4.48, 4.51, and 4.56 we deduce (4.45). This completes the proof of P1.
(End of Proof P1.)
P4 : (8 i; j :: L
i
^ :  L
i
^ (8k :: :L
k
) U L
j
) i < j) .
Proof: Assume L
i
^ :  L
i
^ (8k :: :L
k
) U L
j
, so j is the immediate successor of i. We
have that i6=j in an equivalent way as in the proof of P4 for Protocol 1 (see previous section).
We now prove that for a leader i it is always the case that leaders in the future will be at
least as good as i (note that i may remain a leader for a while).
Lemma 4.57
(8 i; j :: L
i
) 2 (L
j
) i  j)) .
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From lemma 4.57 and i6=j we immediately deduce P4. The proof of 4.57 is as follows.
Assume L
i
. In case i never capitulates 4.57 holds trivially. Therefore, consider the case that
i capitulates once. Let j be i's successor and assume i>j. From 4.34, 4.39, and 4.49 we infer
that a process can not become a leader in presence of a better leader or candidate that has
received its original I-message:
Lemma 4.58
(8 j :: J C
j
^ (9k : j < k : 3 (rcv
k
(I(j)) ^ CL
k
)) ) :3L
j
) .
The idea of the proof is to show that i can not be succeeded by a smaller process, j say (i>j),
as there is always a better candidate or leader process than j that receives I(j)|and thus
prevents j of becoming a leader.
In order for i, i>j, to become a leader i has transmitted I(i). So, i has left the start state
before j becomes a candidate. From the following statement which is proven below
Lemma 4.59
(8 j :: (9 k : j < k : send
k
(I(k))) ) 2 (9k : j < k : CL
k
)) ,
we infer that there is still a better process than j, k say, for which CL
k
holds. This process
receives I(j) and will prevent j of becoming a leader (according to 4.58). This contradicts
with j being a successor of i and completes the proof.
It remains to prove lemma 4.59. From the protocol description we infer that after the sending
of an I-message the sending process is in either the candidate or leader state. Formally,
Property 4.60
(8k :: send
k
(I(k)) )  CL
k
) .
Moreover, we have that candidates and leaders leave their (combined) state if and only if they
receive an I-message with an identity larger than their own identity.
Property 4.61
(8k :: CL
k
) (2 : (9m : k < m : rcv
k
(I(m))) , 2CL
k
)) .
From property 4.60 we infer that at the next moment process k, k>j, transmits I(k), there is
a better candidate or leader than j. Furthermore, from 4.61 we infer that as candidates and
leaders can only be forced to a state dierent from leader and candidate by better congeners
(as they only leave their state on receipt of I(m) with m>k, and as I-messages are only sent
by processes that are either candidate or leader) 4.59 holds. This completes the proof of P4.
(End of Proof P4.)
P2 : 3 (9 i :: L
i
) .
Proof: The proof of this requirement is rather straightforward. As continuously enabled
transitions can not be ignored indenitely (weak fairness assumption) each process in the
start state becomes a candidate eventually:
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Property 4.62
(8 i :: S
i
) 3C
i
) .
Moreover, according to 4.44 a process sends an I-message so as to become a candidate.
Consequently, each process sends an I-message sooner or later. Now consider the process
with the maximum identity, process max
id
, say. Due to the niteness of the set Id this
process exists. (We like to stress that the niteness of Id is crucial for the correctness of
Protocol 2, whilst for the correctness of Protocol 1 this is irrelevant.) Once, this process
transmits its I-message and becomes a candidate. As there is no `better' process that can
reply it follows from assumptions 4.33 and 4.34 that process max
id
can perform its timeout
and becomes a leader. Thus, we have that process max
id
becomes a leader sooner or later.
Furthermore, since leaders can only be succeeded by better processes (see P4), we have
Property 4.63
(L
max
id
) 2L
max
id
) .
Thus we conclude
Lemma 4.64
3L
max
id
,
which directly implies P2.
(End of Proof P2.)
P3 : (8 i :: L
i
^ (9 j : i < j : :L
j
) ) 3 :L
i
) .
Proof: The idea is to prove P3 along similar lines as in the previous section by rst refor-
mulating P3 using :L
j
 S
j
_ C
j
_ F
j
. Once a process becomes failed it remains failed
forever (4.47). A process only becomes failed after receipt of an I-message with a larger
identity. This follows from (the stronger):
Property 4.65
(8 i :: 2 : (9 j : i < j : rcv
i
(I(j))) , 2 :F
i
) .
From lemma 4.59 and property 4.65 we conclude:
Property 4.66
(8 i :: F
i
) (9 j : i < j : CL
j
)) ,
or, using P1:
Property 4.67
(8 i; j : i < j : L
i
^ F
j
) (9 k : j < k : C
k
)) .
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Note that it is no longer guaranteed that failed processes are always smaller than the leader
process (like in the previous protocol). This is due to the fact that in Protocol 1 only the
leader process may force candidates to become failed, whereas in Protocol 2 also candidates
may force other candidates to become failed.
From 4.62 we deduce that each process becomes a candidate at some time. Therefore, we
may rene P3 (as for Protocol 1) into
Lemma 4.68
(8 i :: L
i
^ (9 j : i < j : C
j
) ) 3 :L
i
) .
It remains to establish lemma 4.68. This follows rather straightforward. Assume L
i
^C
j
^
i<j. According to 4.44 j has transmitted I(j) so as to become a candidate. This message is
received by i when either L
i
or F
i
holds (otherwise i would not have become a leader). In case
L
i
, 3 :L
i
follows directly from property 4.49. For F
i
we already have :L
i
. This completes
the proof of P3.
(End of Proof P3.)
Likewise for Protocol 1, it remains to verify that no unspecied receptions can occur. As there
is only one message type involved, and as corresponding transitions exist for this message
type (for all possible parameters) in all states, and as processes do not receive their own
transmitted messages it is evident that no unspecied receptions are possible. This completes
the correctness proof of Protocol 2.
4.4 Verication of Protocol 3
The purpose of this section is to prove that Protocol 3 satises requirements Q1 through Q6,
and that no unspecied receptions can occur. We take a similar approach as in the previous
sections.
Like for the previous protocol the timeout mechanism plays a crucial role in establishing
the correctness of Protocol 3 with respect to requirements Q1 through Q6. We take as a
starting-point the semantics of the timeout mechanism as dened in the previous section (cf.
assumptions 4.33 and 4.34).
4.4.1 Timeout Properties
In Protocol 2 a process is only a candidate once (according to (4.36)) and as a timeout can
appear at most once the association between, for instance, C
i
and timeout
i
in a statement
like C
i
^3timeout
i
is unique: the timeout that eventually will occur is the timeout used
by i to leave the candidate state referred to by statement C
i
. Due to the intrinsic recursive
behaviour of Protocol 3 such is no longer true. When stating, for instance, C
i
^3timeout
p
i
there is no formal relation between the rst and second conjunct: process imay be a candidate
for a while, leave this state and become a candidate again and then leaving this state on
timeout
p
i
. Stating C
i
referring to the rst period in the candidate state has no relation at all
37
with timeout
p
i
. In order to establish such a relation the idea is to refer to the I(i) message
on which i has become a candidate|and which must have number p such that it corresponds
with the next timeout of i to occur
5
. Note that it is possible to refer to the I(i) message on
which i has become a candidate in the temporal logic formalism we use. However, we also
want to refer to the receipt of this message by some other process. This is not possible in
temporal logic, but is rather straightforward when introducing explicit labelling of I-messages.
We repeat the timeout properties and reformulate some of them when necessary.
Property 4.69
(8 i :: timeout
i
) C
i
) .
Once a process enters the candidate state by transmission of I
p
(i) and the corresponding
timeout occurs eventually (i.e. 3timeout
p
i
) it does not leave the candidate state until this
timeout occurs. Note that this also implies that the process does not crash in between the
transmission and the corresponding timeout.
Property 4.70
(8 i :: send
i
(I
p
(i)) ^  C
i
^ 3timeout
p
i
) C
i
U timeout
p
i
) .
As in Protocol 2, a candidate i becomes failed on receipt of I(j) with i<j,
Property 4.71
(8 i :: C
i
^ (9 j : i < j : rcv
i
(I(j))) )  F
i
) ,
From properties 4.70 and 4.71 we infer
Property 4.72
(8 i :: send
i
(I
p
(i)) ^  C
i
^ 3timeout
p
i
) : (9 j : i < j : rcv
i
(I(j))) U timeout
p
i
) .
4.4.2 Proof of requirements
We now start with proving the requirements one by one. The rst proof obligation is:
Q1 : (9 i :: L
i
) (8 j : i 6= j : :L
j
)) .
Proof: Following an analogous reasoning as for the proof of P1 for Protocol 2 we deduce
that the interesting case to prove is
5
We remark that another possibility would be to equip the C
i
predicates with a number as the timeout
p
i
predicates and let the relationship with the I
p
(i)-message on which i has become a candidate implicit. For the
sake of clarity we prefer to give the explicit relation.
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Lemma 4.73
(9 i :: timeout
i
) (8 j : i 6= j : :L
j
)) .
According to 4.69 a timeout can only occur when a process is in the candidate state. A
process only becomes a candidate after sending an I-message.
Property 4.74
(8 i :: C
i
) send
i
(I(i))) .
Similarly to the proof of P1 in the previous section the crux of our proof is
Lemma 4.75
(8 i; j :: rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) :L
j
)) .
We now prove lemma 4.75 for each possible state of the recipient of message I
p
(i), process j
say, given that i becomes a leader once (i.e. 3timeout
p
i
).
First consider process j to be either leader, failed, or candidate. For convenience let CLF
j
denote C
j
_ L
j
_ F
j
. From the protocol description we immediately infer:
Property 4.76
(8 i; j :: CLF
j
^ rcv
j
(I(i)) ) (j < i)  F
j
) ^ (j > i) send
j
(I(j))) ) .
Using 4.34, 4.72, and 4.76 we obtain
Lemma 4.77
(8 i; j :: CLF
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) j < i) .
In contrast with Protocol 2, we can not directly conclude 4.75 for candidate, leader, and
failed processes from lemma 4.77: in the previous protocol a failed process remains failed
indenitely, whereas |due to its recursive behaviour| in Protocol 3 this is not the case.
So, we have to prove that although process j did not reply on I
p
(i) it can not be a leader
when timeout
p
i
holds. From 4.76 and 4.77 we infer that, given 3timeout
p
i
, we only have
to consider processes j for which j<i. According to 4.76 j becomes failed on receipt of I
p
(i).
It can only become a leader by transmitting I
q
(j) on becoming a candidate. As process i is
still being a candidate, according to property 4.70, j is not able to become a leader before i
is becoming a leader: j has to wait for i's reply (see timeout semantics) and as j<i process i
will reply on receipt of I
q
(j) thus preventing j becoming a leader. So, we conclude
Lemma 4.78
(8 i; j :: CLF
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) :L
j
)) .
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In the above reasoning we only have considered perfect processes, i.e. processes that do not
crash. However, when considering the crash of process j (i>j) it can be deduced in a similar
way that after recovering j can not become a leader before i is becoming a leader. Note that
due to 4.70 i does not crash before becoming a leader. So, crashes of i do not have to be
taken into account.
Finally, consider process j to be either start or dead on the moment of processing I
p
(i). Let
SD
j
denote S
j
_ D
j
. From the protocol it immediately follows that start and dead processes
ignore all messages.
Property 4.79
(8 i :: S
i
^ rcv
i
(m
1
) )  S
i
^ : send
i
(m
2
)) ,
Property 4.80
(8 i :: D
i
^ rcv
i
(m
1
) )  D
i
^ : send
i
(m
2
)) ,
so j ignores I
p
(i). Now the same case analysis as in the proof of P1 of Protocol 2 for start
processes can be made and by similar arguments it can be proven that
Lemma 4.81
(8 i; j :: SD
j
^ rcv
j
(I
p
(i)) ^ 3timeout
p
i
) 2 (timeout
p
i
) :L
j
)) .
For the sake of brevity we here omit this case analysis. Again, when considering the crash of
process j it can also be veried rather easily that after recovering j can not become a leader
before i becomes a leader.
From lemmata 4.78 and 4.81 we conclude 4.75. This completes the proof of Q1.
(End of Proof Q1.)
Q2 : 3 (9 i :: 2 (:D
i
^ (8 j : i < j : D
j
))) ) 23 (9 i :: L
i
) .
Proof: Consider the process with the maximum identity, i
0
say, for which 32 (:D
i
0
^
(8 j : i
0
< j : D
j
)) holds. According to the premise of Q2 this process exists. The idea of the
proof is to establish that process i
0
will always become a leader sooner or later. That is, we
prove
Lemma 4.82
3L
i
0
,
from which we directly deduce Q2. The proof is as follows. Consider process i
0
at the moment
that all better processes than i
0
are crashed for ever, that is, (8k : i
0
< k : 2D
k
). Remark that
|although all better processes are crashed| process i
0
may still have messages originating
from these processes in its buer, as processes may process buered messages at their own
pace. Now refer to the moment at which i
0
has processed all messages from these processes.
That is, assume
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Assumption 4.83
I ) 3 (8k : i
0
< k : m
k
62 Q
i
0
^ 2D
k
) ,
where m
k
denotes a message originating from process k. Distinguish between two cases: i
0
is
already a leader, or it is not. Consider the rst case, so L
i
0
holds. From the protocol descrip-
tion we immediately infer that leaders can only capitulate by either crashing or receiving an
I(k)-message with k larger than their own identity. Formally,
Property 4.84
(8 i :: J :L
i
) D
i
_ (9 j : i < j : rcv
i
(I(j))) ) .
Given that i
0
does not crash there is only one possibility to capitulate, namely by receiving
I(k), k>i
0
. It is straightforward to observe that I(k)-messages are only transmitted by process
k.
Property 4.85
(8 i; k :: send
i
(I(k)) ) i = k) .
Furthermore, crashed processes do not transmit messages. That is,
Property 4.86
(8k :: send
k
(m) ) :D
k
) .
Using 4.83 and the above reasoning it can easily be deduced that it is impossible for i
0
to
receive a message I(k), k>i
0
, and consequently, it is impossible for i
0
to capitulate. Thus, we
conclude:
Lemma 4.87
(L
i
0
^ (8 k : i
0
< k : 2D
k
^ m
k
62 Q
i
0
) ) 2L
i
0
) .
Secondly, we consider the case that i
0
is not a leader. Recall that 4.83 holds. From the
protocol specication we directly infer that processes that will never crash and are not leader
(yet) will become a candidate once.
Property 4.88
(8 i :: 2 :D
i
^ :L
i
) 3C
i
) .
Once, process i
0
transmits its I-message and becomes a candidate. As there is no `better'
process that can reply |they are all crashed for ever| it follows from assumptions 4.33 and
4.34 that i
0
can perform its timeout and becomes a leader. Using an analogous reasoning as
for the rst case we conclude that i
0
will be a leader indenitely. This concludes the proof of
Q2.
(End of Proof Q2.)
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Q3 : (8 i :: : (L
i
^ D
i
)) .
Proof: This follows directly from the denition of nite state machines, where a process can
only be in one state `at a time'.
(End of Proof Q3.)
Q4 : (8 i; j :: L
i
^ :D
j
^ i < j ) 3 :L
i
_ 3D
j
) .
Proof: Assume L
i
^ :D
j
^ i<j. Distinguish between two cases: 2 :D
j
and 3D
j
. The
latter case corresponds to the second disjunct of the conclusion of Q4. Consider 2 :D
j
.
From (4.88) and Q1 we infer that 3C
j
holds. According to a similar reasoning as for P3 of
the previous protocol we observe that it is sucient to prove:
Lemma 4.89
(8 i; j :: L
i
^ C
j
^ 2 :D
j
^ i < j ) 3 :L
i
) .
It remains to establish lemma 4.89. Assume L
i
^C
j
^2 :D
j
^ i<j. According to property
4.74 j has transmitted I(j) so as to become a candidate. This message is processed by i after
it became a leader|otherwise the message would have prevented i of becoming a leader. If
i has already capitulated 3 :L
i
follows directly. In case L
i
holds, i capitulates according to
4.76. This completes the proof of Q4.
(End of Proof Q4.)
Q5 : (8 i :: J :L
i
) D
i
_ (9 j : i < j : :D
j
)) .
Proof: According to 4.84 there are only two possible ways in which a leader can capitulate.
First, it may spontaneously crash. This corresponds to the rst part of the conclusion of
Q5. Secondly, leader i capitulates on receipt of an I(j)-message with i<j. We prove that
this corresponds to the second alternative of the conclusion of Q5. From the communication
axioms we have that for all (unique) messages m:
Assumption 4.90
(8 i :: rcv
i
(m) ) (9 j : i 6= j : send
j
(m)) ) .
Due to property 4.85 I(j)-messages can only be transmitted by process j. Furthermore,
crashed processes can not transmit messages (due to property 4.86). Thus, we conclude
Lemma 4.91
(8 i; j : i < j : rcv
i
(I(j)) ) (:D
j
^ send
j
(I(j))) ) .
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Using 4.84 this concludes the proof of Q5.
(End of Proof Q5.)
Q6 : (8 i :: L
i
^  :L
i
^ ((8k :: :L
k
) ^ :D
i
) U L
j
) i  j) .
Proof: Assume L
i
^  :L
i
^ ((8k :: :L
k
)^ :D
i
) U L
j
. So, j is the immediate successor
of leader i and i does not crash in between the leaderships of i and j. The proof is by
contradiction. Assume i>j. From the protocol description we immediately infer that:
Property 4.92
(8 i :: CLF
i
^ 2 :D
i
) 2CLF
i
) .
So, in case a leader capitulates and does not crash it is either a candidate, leader or failed
process. From lemma 4.77 it follows that a process can not become a leader in presence of a
better candidate, leader or failed process. This implies that j (j<i) can not become a leader
when i is still in one of these states, which is, according to the premise :D
i
U L
j
and the
above property the case. This completes the proof of Q6.
(End of Proof Q6.)
The remaining proof obligation is the absence of unspecied receptions. As there is only one
message type involved, and as corresponding transitions exist for this message type (for all
possible parameter values) in all states, and as processes do not receive their own transmit-
ted messages, it is evident that no unspecied receptions are possible. This completes the
correctness proof of Protocol 3.
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5 ACP Specications
In this section the three protocols of section 3 are specied in ACP. We take the Finite
State Machine specications as a starting-point. The ACP specications are as close to these
specications as possible.
We will give a specication of all separate processes that play a role (protocol processes,
buers, timers, the transmission medium) and of the processes that are built from these
separate processes. These are a component (the parallel composition of a protocol process, a
buer process and, if applied, a timer process) and the whole system (the parallel composition
of all components and the medium). Preceding the protocol specications a short introduction
to ACP is provided.
5.1 Introduction to ACP
ACP, the Algebra of Communicating Processes, is an axiom based mathematical theory for
concurrency. ACP has been applied to a large domain of specication problems, ranging
from communication protocols, algorithms for systolic systems and electronic circuits up to
architectures for Computer Integrated Manufacturing.
This brief introduction is by no means intended to be complete, but merely gives an intuitive
notion of what we are dealing with. For a detailed treatment of ACP we refer to [BW90].
ACP starts from a set of objects, called atomic actions, atoms or steps. Atomic actions are
the basic and indivisible elements of ACP. In this introduction they will be represented by
the symbols a through f . In ACP all atomic actions are elementary processes. Moreover, we
have
 , deadlock. Deadlock is the state in which there is no possibility to proceed.
  , silent step.  represents the process terminating after some time, without performing
observable actions.
Atomic actions may be parameterised with data. There are no strict syntactical constraints:
a
d
, a
d
and a(d) all three denote the atomic action a, parameterised with the data element d.
Processes, in this introduction denoted by the symbols x; y; z, are generated from atomic
actions and process terms by means of operators. Process names may also be parameterised
with data. The most important operators are:
  , sequential composition or product.
x  y is the process that executes x rst and continues with y upon termination of x.
 + , alternative composition or sum.
x+ y is the process that rst makes a choice between its summands x and y, and then
proceeds with the execution of the chosen summand. In the presence of an alternative,
 is never chosen.
The construct
P
d2D
x(d) is used for the generalised alternative composition x(d
1
) +
x(d
2
) + : : : + x(d
n
), with d
1
; : : : ; d
n
the elements of D.
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 k , parallel composition or merge.
x k y is the process that represents the merged execution of x and y.
The construct k
d2D
x(d) is used for the generalised parallel composition x(d
1
) k x(d
2
) k
: : : k x(d
n
), with d
1
; : : : ; d
n
the elements of D.
 j , communication.
As stated above, x k y represents the merged execution of x and y. This means that
the rst action of this composed process is a rst action from x or from y or from both.
In the last case the two actions from x and y are part of a communication between x
and y, also called a synchronization of x and y. Such a communication has to be dened
explicitly by using the communication operator: a j b = c means that c is the action
that is the result of the communication between the actions a and b.
 @
H
, encapsulation.
@
H
(x) is the process x without the possibility of performing actions from the set of
atomic actions H. Algebraically this is achieved by renaming all atomic actions from
H in x into .
 
I
, abstraction.

I
(x) is the process x without the possibility of observing actions from the set of atomic
actions I. This is achieved by renaming all atomic actions from I in x into  .
  , priority.
(x) is the process in which the choice between alternative actions is made according
to an ordering on the atomic actions, dened somewhere else. If, in an alternative
composition, two atomic actions may be chosen on which an order relation is dened,
only the action with the highest priority will be enabled.
 / . , conditional process.
The construct x / c . y denotes a conditional process expression. If the boolean ex-
pression c evaluates to true the process expression reduces to x. If c evaluates to false
the process expression reduces to y.
Processes are specied by equations like
x = a  b+ c  (e+ f)
y = (a  b) k (c  d)
\Innite" processes are specied by one or more recursive equations. A simple and meaning-
less example:
x = a  y + b  z
y = c  z
z = d  x+ e  y
Possible execution traces of this process are: a  c  d  b  e::: ; b  d  b  d::: ; a  c  e  c  d:::.
The executable formal specication language PSF [MV90] is based on ACP for its process
part. The denition of data in PSF is based on ASF [BHK89].
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5.2 Protocol 1
We start with the specication of Protocol 1 from section 3.2.2. First the protocol process
and a local buer process are specied. We will use the following naming convention for the
atomic actions involved in the communication between a protocol process, a buer process
and the medium. The transmission of a message is denoted by send XY
i
. X represents the
source and Y represents the destination: P for protocol process, B for buer process orM for
medium process. The superscript i denotes the component id. In the same way the reception
of a message is denoted by read XY
i
and the resulting communication action is denoted by
comm XY
i
. ID represents the set of component ids. We consider the size of ID to be xed
and nite. M represents the set of messages: M = fI(i); R(i) j i 2 IDg.
Specication of the protocol process of component i:
Start
i
=
P
m2M
read BP
i
(m)  Start
i
+ reset buer
i
 send PM
i
(I(i))  Candidate
i
Candidate
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  Candidate
i
+
P
j 2 IDnfig
read BP
i
(R(j))
(send PM
i
(I(i))  Candidate
i
/ j < i . Failed
i
)
+ read BP
i
(R(i))  Leader
i
Leader
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))
(send PM
i
(R(i))  Leader
i
/ j < i . send PM
i
(R(j))  Failed
i
)
Failed
i
=
P
m2M
read BP
i
(m)  Failed
i
The local buer process is specied as a queue of unbounded size. The process Buer
i
is
parameterised with a message queue q. The queue operations enq (enqueue), serve and deq
(dequeue) need no further explanation. The buer can be reset by the protocol process. This
reset is used in order to prevent the processing of messages enqueued before the component
enters the election.
Buer
i
(q) =
P
m2M
read MB
i
(m)  Buer
i
(enq(m; q))
+ send BP
i
(serve(q))  Buer
i
(deq(q)) / q 6= empty queue . 
+ read buer reset
i
 Buer
i
(empty queue)
The following communications are dened between a protocol process and its local buer
process:
send BP
i
(m) j read BP
i
(m) = comm BP
i
(m)
reset buer
i
j read buer reset
i
= buer is reset
i
A component process consists of the encapsulated merge of the protocol process and the buer
process. One component, say l (l 2 ID), starts in the leader state:
Component
l
= @
H
1
(Leader
l
k Buer
l
(empty queue) )
The other components start in the start state (i 2 IDnflg):
Component
i
= @
H
1
(Start
i
k Buer
i
(empty queue) )
Denition of the encapsulation set:
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H1
= fread BP
i
(m); send BP
i
(m); reset buer
i
; read buer reset
i
j i 2 ID;m 2Mg
The medium process reads a message from a component and sends this message to all other
components, thus modelling a broadcast communication. The set ID contains all the com-
ponent ids, the set IDS is a variable set of component ids.
Medium =
P
i2 ID;m2M
read PM
i
(m) Medium(IDnfig;m)
Medium(IDS;m) = (k
i2 IDS
send MB
i
(m) ) Medium
The following communications are dened between a component and the medium process:
send PM
i
(m) j read PM
i
(m) = comm PM
i
(m)
send MB
i
(m) j read MB
i
(m) = comm MB
i
(m)
The complete system consists of the encapsulated merge of all components and the medium:
System1 = @
H
2
((k
i2 ID
Component
i
) k Medium)
Denition of the encapsulation set:
H
2
= fsend PM
i
(m); read PM
i
(m); send MB
i
(m); read MB
i
(m) j i 2 ID; m 2Mg
Remark: at this point we notice an important dierence between the execution model of the
Finite State Machines of section 3 and the ACP execution model. For a transition in an FSM
specication the evaluation of a guard and the related action are considered to be atomic:
the receiving of a message and the transmission of a reply on this message together form a
single atomic event. However, in ACP these are two separate actions. Due to the arbitrary
interleaving model, other actions may come in between these two actions. This dierence has
some inuence on the complexity results of section 3. This is discussed in section 5.6.
5.3 Intermezzo: timeout semantics and ACP { part 1
Protocols 2 and 3 make use of a timer, which may generate a timeout. In this section we will
discuss the modelling of a timeout in ACP, related to the protocols investigated here.
For certain classes of protocols the correctness of the protocol does not depend on the moment
a timeout is raised in relation to other actions in the protocol. For instance, Sliding Window
Protocols are robust with respect to premature timeouts. In an ACP specication of these
protocols a timeout is modelled by a non-deterministic choice between a timeout action and
other enabled actions, see [Bru91]. Other protocols are not robust with respect to premature
timeouts. A classical example is the simple PAR protocol, see [Vaa90]. (PAR stands for
Positive Acknowledgement with Retransmission.) From section 3 it may be clear that the
Leader Election protocols investigated in this document cannot deal with premature timeouts:
a timeout may not be enabled before all responses to the initial message are generated and
processed.
We distinguish three possible approaches to avoid premature timeouts in ACP. The rst two
approaches are action oriented, the last approach is data oriented.
1. A timeout action is not enabled as long as certain actions are enabled. This can be
modelled with the priority operator . The timeout action gets a lower priority than
other actions, application of the priority operator prohibits the timeout as long as one
of the actions with a higher priority is enabled. This approach is used in [Vaa90].
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2. A timeout action is enabled after the execution of certain actions. These actions serve as
a kind of synchronization for the timeout. Usually this is the only role of these actions,
within the specied protocol these actions do not have any other meaning. Therefore
we will call them sync actions. In [Vaa90] this approach is shortly mentioned for the
PAR protocol, in [vW93] it is applied in a PSF specication of the same protocol.
3. In a data oriented approach a timeout action may be enabled if a certain boolean con-
dition is evaluated to true. This condition is based on data parameters of the specied
system. This requires a specication where state information is put in the data param-
eters of the process equation(s).
In the remaining part of this section we will investigate the usefulness of the rst two al-
ternatives in the realm of the Protocols 2 and 3. In section 6 Protocol 2 and Protocol 3
are captured in a single recursive equation with data parameters. There we will discuss the
usefulness of the third alternative.
Application of the priority operator (alternative 1) implies the denition of a set of orderings
on actions in which a timeout of component i gets a lower priority than every action that
is related to the reply to the initial message from this component. A reply can be made
recognizable by labelling the initial I-message with its source and by attaching the same label
to all replies to this message.
Two problems arise when this approach is followed. The rst problem has to do with the
buering of incoming messages. When queueing is applied, a message in a queue is only
related with the comm BP action if it is at the head of the queue, otherwise no enabled
actions are related with this message. When smart buering is applied the message in the
buer may be replaced by a better one. By this replacement the label of a message is lost.
This kind of buering problems can be solved by a more complex labelling of the messages.
We will not go into the details of such a solution. The second problem has to do with the fact
that if the medium is in use (a message has been transmitted to the medium by a component,
but has not been buered by all other components), a comm PM action with a reply message
to a component i may temporarily be disabled although the timeout of a component i should
still be prohibited by this action.
The second problem can only be solved in a rather crude way by placing more restrictions
on a timeout action. The timeout of a component i is given a lower priority than every
comm MB action in order to prevent a temporary blockade of a comm PM action. The
timeout is also given a lower priority than every comm BP action in order to guarantee that
every component has had the possibility to react on a message. Finally, the timeout is given
a lower priority than every comm PM action from a component with an id higher than i
in order to ensure that every reply is received by component i before its timeout is enabled.
This leads to the following ordering relations:
timeout
i
< comm MB
k
(m),
timeout
i
< comm BP
k
(m)
timeout
i
< comm PM
j
(m), with m 2M; i; j; k 2 ID; j > i.
Labelling of messages is not useful any more. The atomic action timeout
i
is the result of
a communication between the protocol process and the timer process of a component i, see
below.
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Application of sync actions for the synchronization of a timeout (alternative 2) can be based
on the observation that a timeout is permitted when every other component is in the start
state (has not yet entered the election), in the failed state (has already lost the election)
or has made a transition from the start state to the candidate state after the transmission
of the initial message of the component that is waiting for its timeout (is not expected to
prohibit the timeout). It is impossible to identify the last set of components without a
substantial expansion of the specication. Therefore it is reasonable to focus on a little
bit stronger condition which requires that a timeout action is only enabled when all other
components are in the start state or in the failed state. This leads to the addition of an action
send timeout enable in the start state and the failed state of a protocol process. A timer
process collects these permissions by communicating read timeout enable actions. Only when
all permissions are given a timeout is enabled. This approach leads to two extra actions in
the protocol process and a little bit more complicated timer process.
In the case of our Leader Election protocols there is no clear advantage of one alternative
above the other, both have their (dis)advantages. In the specication of Protocols 2 and 3
we have chosen to model the timeout semantics cf. alternative 1: a timeout is enabled if
certain other actions are disabled. We see this as more close to the dynamic character of the
protocols than alternative 2, where a timeout is only enabled if all other components are not
actively participating in the election (any more).
5.4 Protocol 2
We continue with the specication of Protocol 2 from section 3. We will give a new spec-
ication of the protocol process itself and of the buer process. We now will use a \smart
buer" in which only the message with the highest id is kept. A timer process, responsible
for the generation of a timeout, is also specied. In this protocol we have one message type,
M = fI(i) j i 2 IDg. Specication of the protocol process of component i (i 2 ID):
Start
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  Start
i
+ reset buer
i
 send PM
i
(I(i))  start timer
i
 Candidate
i
Candidate
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))
(send PM
i
(I(i))  Candidate
i
/ j < i . stop timer
i
 Failed
i
)
+ read timeout
i
 Leader
i
Leader
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))
(send PM
i
(I(i))  Leader
i
/ j < i . Failed
i
)
Failed
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  Failed
i
The local smart buer process only stores the message with the highest id. The buer can be
reset by the protocol process. The parameter b is used to keep the message with the highest
id stored. The function max(m
1
;m
2
) takes two messages as input and produces the message
with the highest id as output.
Buer
i
=
P
m2M
read MB
i
(m)  Buer
i
(m)
+ read buer reset
i
 Buer
i
Buer
i
(b) =
P
m2M
read MB
i
(m)  Buer
i
(max(b;m))
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+ send BP
i
(b)  Buer
i
+ read buer reset
i
 Buer
i
The local timer process is very simple: when a start signal is received the timer waits for a stop
signal. If this signal does not appear, a timeout is sent to the protocol process. The waiting
for a stop signal and the transmission of the timeout signal is specied as an alternative
composition of two process expressions. We will suppose that no start signal is given while
waiting for a stop signal or a timeout. As described in the previous section, the timeout
semantics will be modelled with the priority operator, see below.
T imer
i
= read start
i
 T imer s
i
T imer s
i
= read stop
i
 T imer
i
+ send timeout
i
 T imer
i
The communications between a protocol process and its local timer are dened as follows:
start timer
i
j read start
i
= timer started
i
stop timer
i
j read stop
i
= timer stopped
i
send timeout
i
j read timeout
i
= timeout
i
In this protocol we assume that there is no leader at the beginning, so all components are
initially in the start state:
Component
i
= @
H
3
(Start
i
k Buer
i
k T imer
i
)
The encapsulation set is dened as follows:
H
3
= H
1
[ fstart timer
i
; read start
i
; stop timer
i
; read stop
i
; send timeout
i
;
read timeout
i
j i 2 IDg
with H
1
as dened in section 5.2.
The medium process is the same as in the specication of Protocol 1.
The semantics of the timeout are modelled with the priority operator . This leads to the
following specication of the complete system:
System2 =   @
H
2
((k
i2 ID
Component
i
) k Medium)
withH
2
as dened in section 5.2. From section 5.3 we recall the order relations for the priority
operator :
timeout
i
< comm MB
k
(m),
timeout
i
< comm BP
k
(m),
timeout
i
< comm PM
j
(m), with m 2M; i; j; k 2 ID; j > i.
5.5 Protocol 3
In this protocol components may crash. Such a crash has consequences not only for the
protocol process, but also for the local buer process and the timer process. Therefore all
component processes need to be reconsidered. In the specication below we will use a simple
model of a component crash:
 Only the protocol process has the possibility to crash. The buer process and the timer
process will simply continue (as far as possible) after a crash of the protocol process.
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 The \revival" of a component is modelled by the revival of the protocol process. At its
revival this process resets the local timer. The local buer is reset in the start state,
which is entered after the revival.
 In the specication of the protocol process a transition from a state to the Dead state
is modelled by the atomic action crash. The transition from the Dead state to the start
state is modelled by the atomic action revive. These actions do not communicate with
any action from any other process.
In ACP there is no distinction between must-actions and may-actions (the solid arrows and
the dashed arrows from the Finite State Machine Diagram of Protocol 3 in section 3). The
plus operator for alternative composition stands for a non-deterministic choice between the
alternatives. So we are not able to model this specic property of a process crash in ACP.
Specication of the protocol process of component i:
Start
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  Start
i
+ reset buer
i
 send PM
i
(I(i))  start timer
i
 Candidate
i
+ crash
i
Dead
i
Candidate
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))
(send PM
i
(I(i))  Candidate
i
/ j < i . stop timer
i
 Failed
i
)
+ read timeout
i
 Leader
i
+ crash
i
Dead
i
Leader
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  (send PM
i
(I(i))  Leader
i
/ j < i . Failed
i
)
+ crash
i
Dead
i
Failed
i
=
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))
(send PM
i
(I(i))  start timer
i
 Candidate
i
/ j < i . Failed
i
)
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  start timer
i
 Candidate
i
+ crash
i
Dead
i
Dead
i
= revive
i
 reset timer
i
 Start
i
As in the previous protocol the local smart buer process only stores the message with the
highest identity. A crash of the protocol process is not observed by the buer. However,
after the reception of a reset signal the buer goes to the initial state again. This is already
specied in the specication of the buer process in the previous section. We will not repeat
this specication here.
In the timer process in each state the action read timer reset is added:
T imer
i
= read start
i
 T imer s
i
+ read timer reset
i
 T imer
i
T imer s
i
= read stop
i
 T imer
i
+ send timeout
i
 T imer
i
+ read timer reset
i
 T imer
i
Denition of the additional communication between the protocol process and the timer pro-
cess:
reset timer
i
j read timer reset
i
= timer is reset
i
In this protocol we assume that there is no leader at the beginning, so all components are
initially in the start state:
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Component
i
= @
H
4
(Start
i
k Buer
i
k T imer
i
)
Denition of the encapsulation set:
H
4
= H
3
[ freset timer
i
; read timer reset
i
j i 2 IDg
with H
3
dened as before.
The medium process is the same as in the specication of Protocol 1 (and 2). The modelling
of the timeout is the same as in the specication of Protocol 2. So we get the following
denition of the Leader Election protocol:
System3 =   @
H
2
((k
i2 ID
Component
i
) k Medium)
The set H
2
has been dened before.
5.6 Action atomicity and complexity results
We conclude this section with some remarks about the complexity results of section 3 and the
execution model of ACP. The complexity analysis in section 3 is based on the atomicity of the
action sequence event-plus-reaction, e.g. the reception of a message and the transmission of a
reply message. This kind of atomicity is common in Finite State Machine formalisms. How-
ever, in ACP read actions and send actions are atomic actions themselves. The interleaving
model of ACP allows other actions to be executed between a read action and the consecutive
send action. This means that, after reading a message from its buer, a component may have
to wait until some actions from other components have been executed before it transmits a
reply message. Compared to the FSM model the ner interleaving execution model of ACP
introduces the possibility of a delayed reaction of a component process, which means that an
extra message buer is introduced within a component. This has a certain inuence on the
complexity results as derived in section 3.
With simple buering (queueing of incoming messages) there will be no dierence: the extra
message buer can be regarded as an extension of the component buer queue. However,
when we use a smart local buer we get dierent results. In Protocol 1 we now get the same
worst case message complexity as in the case without smart buering:
Theorem 5.1 In the ACP interleaving model MC
s
1
(N; i) =MC
q
1
(N; i) =
1
2
N
2
+
1
2
N   1.
Proof: if the reply on the I-message with the lowest id is temporarily buered within the
protocol process, a message sequence like in Figure 5 is possible. After the reception of the
I-message of component i+ 1 the actual leader i can delay its reaction (the transmission of
the R-message) until all other I-messages have been sent. 2
For Protocol 2 we get a worst case message complexity that is still O(N):
Theorem 5.2 In the ACP interleaving model MC
s
2
(1) = 1 and MC
s
2
(N) = 4N   5 for
N > 1.
Proof: The factor 4 comes from the fact that now every component may buer two messages
and so may generate two replies on initial messages from components with a lower id. A third
reaction may be generated by another message from these components. Together with the
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initial message this makes 4. The constant  5 comes from the initial values for MC
s
2
(N):
MC
s
2
(1) = 1, MC
s
2
(2) = 3. These initial values can easily be derived. 2
In Protocol 3 the worst case message complexity is the same as in the case without smart
buering:
Theorem 5.3 In the ACP interleaving model MC
s
3
(N) =MC
q
3
(N) = 2
N
  1.
Proof: The delayed reaction now implies that every component that is about to send a
message to the medium cannot be stopped by a message from a component with a higher
id until this message is sent. This leads to a worst case behaviour in which every message
invokes a message from all components with a higher id. As we have seen before this leads
to an exponential worst case message complexity. 2
In complexity theory it is a well-known fact that the underlying machine model has a big
inuence on the complexity of the algorithm [vEB90]. Finite State Machines and ACP both
suppose an underlying parallel machine model. The results above show that the execution
model of a specication formalism sometimes also has a major inuence on the complexity of
a distributed algorithm.
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6 Verication and Validation in ACP
6.1 Introduction
In this section we will explore the power of ACP in the eld of verication and validation of
the protocols that have been specied in section 5. With verication we refer to an algebraic
proof of the correctness of a protocol with respect to a set of requirements. If, for whatever
reason, we cannot produce such a proof we may try to validate a protocol, e.g. by simulation.
For the verication of the protocols we will put our specications in the following \normal
form":
P (D) = a
1
 P (D
1
) / c
1
. 
+ a
2
 P (D
2
) / c
2
. 
+ : : :
+ a
n
 P (D
n
) / c
n
. 
D denotes a parameter list. D
i
; 1  i  n; denotes the same parameter list with substitutions
of data terms for some of the parameters. c
i
; 1  i  n; denotes a boolean condition, possibly
containing variables from D. If a condition is invariantly true, a summand may be written
as a
i
 P (D
i
).
The advantage of this normal form lies in the simplication of the calculations that have to
be performed in expanding the merge of several processes to a single equation, which can be
used for verication and validation purposes. In ACP calculations are performed according
to axioms, see [BW90]. Before we turn to these calculations we will give a short introduction
to the ACP axioms.
6.2 ACP axioms
The axioms of Table 2 form the axiom system for ACP. As before, x; y and z denote process
terms, a and b denote atomic actions. We will use the ACP axioms rst of all for the expansion
of the merge of two or more processes. The axiom for the merge operator in Table 2 expands
the merge of two process terms to the alternative composition of three terms. The process
term x y (x leftmerge y) denotes the merge of x and y with the rst action from x. The
process term x j y denotes the communication (synchronisation) between the processes x and
y.
The merge axiom can be generalized to the expansion theorem for n  3:
x
1
k : : : k x
n
=
P
1in
x
i
(k
1jn; j 6=i
x
j
) +
P
1i<jn
(x
i
jx
j
) (k
1kn;k 6=i;j
x
k
)
From section 5 it is clear that in the specication of the protocols conditional process ex-
pressions are frequently used. In [BB92] several axioms are given for conditional process
expressions. From these axioms the following identities can be derived.
Lemma 6.1
1. x / c . x = x
2. x / c . y = x / c .  + y / :c . 
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x+ y = y + x
(x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)
x+ x = x
(x+ y)  z = x  z + y  z
(x  y)  z = x  (y  z)
x+  = x
  x = 
x k y = x y + y x+ x j y
a x = a  x
(a  x) y = a  (x k y)
(x+ y) z = (x z) + (y z)
(a  x) j b = (a j b)  x
a j (b  x) = (a j b)  x
(a  x) j (b  y) = (a j b)  (x k y)
(x+ y) j z = x j z + y j z
x j (y + z) = x j y + x j z
a j b = (a; b) if  dened
a j b =  otherwise
Table 2: ACP axioms.
3. (x / c
1
. ) / c
2
.  = x / c
1
^ c
2
. 
Proof: elementary, see [Bru]. 2
The axioms in Table 3, also from [BB92], are concerned with the merge and encapsulation of
conditional process expressions. In the specication of the Protocols 2 and 3 in section 5 the
(x / c . y) z = (x z) / c . (y z)
(x / c . y)jz = (xjz) / c . (yjz)
xj(y / c . z) = (xjy) / c . (xjz)
@
H
(x / c . y) = @
H
(x) / c . @
H
(y)
Table 3: Axioms for communication and conditions.
priority operator  is used to model the desired timeout semantics. In [BW90] the axioms for
this operator are given. In this axiomatization an auxiliary operator is used: the binary unless
operator, denoted by /. In order to avoid any confusion between this operator and the left
triangle of a conditional process expression, in this paper we will denote the unless operator
as // . The axioms in Table 4 (from [BB92, BW90]) are concerned with the unless operator
and the priority operator and with the distributivity of these operators over a conditional
process expression. From lemma 6.1 and the axioms for the priority operator the following
identity can be derived for the priority operator and the alternative composition of a nite
number of conditional process terms:
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a // b = a if :(a < b)
a // b =  if a < b
x // y  z = x // y
x // (y + z) = (x // y) // z
x  y // z = (x // z)  y
(x+ y) // z = x // z + y // z
(a) = a
(x  y) = (x)  (y)
(x+ y) = (x) // y + (y) // x
x // (y / c . z) = (x // y) / c . (x // z)
(x / c . y) // z = (x // z) / c . (y // z)
(x / c . y) = (x) / c . (y)
Table 4: ACP

with conditions.
Lemma 6.2
(
P
1in
(a
i
 x
i
/ c
i
. )) =
P
1in
(a
i
 (x
i
) / c
i
^ :(
W
1jn^a
j
>a
i
c
j
) . )
Proof: See [Bru] for a proof with n = 2. 2
Lemma 6.2 states that for an alternative composition of conditional process terms the priority
operator can be \translated" to extra conditions on process terms.
It can be foreseen that, in applying the axioms and rules to the process terms of our protocols,
we will meet an impassable problem. ACP has no formal semantics of data, so the evaluation
of the boolean conditions in the conditional process expressions (which, in our case, are based
on the data parameters of the various processes) cannot be formalized. This means that a
formal verication in a strict sense is impossible. In the remainder of this section we will give
the expansion of the three protocols to a single recursive equation with conditions and we will
discuss some requirements which should be met by these equations. We will shortly discuss
the necessarily informal verication of the protocols with respect to these requirements.
6.3 Protocol 1
We start with an adapted specication of the processes involved in Protocol 1. By adding
states and conditions we will give a specication of each basic process in the normal form
as introduced in section 6.1. The merge of these processes will also be expanded to a single
equation in this normal form.
First, we give a specication of the protocol process in the desired normal form. The pro-
cess P1
i
has two parameters: ps
i
represents a state of the protocol process, j
i
represents a
component-id. In this specication we distinguish seven states:
 S: the start state.
 B: the buer is reset, no initial I-message has been sent yet.
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 C: the candidate state, the initial I-message has been sent.
 T : an R-message is received by a candidate, but has not been processed yet.
 L: the leader state.
 R: an I-message is received by a leader, but has not been processed yet.
 F : the failed state.
Four states (S;C; L and F ) are well-known from previous specications. The three other
states are added in order to get a specication in the desired normal form.
P1
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) =
P
m
p
2M
read BP (m
p
)  P1
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) / ps
i
= S . 
+ reset buer
i
 P1
i
(B; j
i
) / ps
i
= S . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P1
i
(C; j
i
) / ps
i
= B . 
+
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P1
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) / ps
i
= C . 
+
P
j 2 IDnfig
read BP
i
(R(j))  P1
i
(T; j) / ps
i
= C . 
+ read BP
i
(R(i))  P1
i
(L; j
i
) / ps
i
= C . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P1
i
(C; j
i
) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+ P1
i
(F; j
i
) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P1
i
(R; j) / ps
i
= L . 
+ send PM
i
(R(i))  P1
i
(L; j
i
) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+ send PM
i
(R(j
i
))  P1
i
(F; j
i
) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+
P
m
p
2M
read BP
i
(m
p
)  P1
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) / ps
i
= F . 
The specication of the local buer process is the same as in section 5. Only the name has
been shortened to B1
i
and its data parameter now is denoted by q
i
in order to give each
component queue a unique name.
B1
i
(q
i
) =
P
m2M
read MB
i
(m)  B1
i
(enq(m; q
i
))
+ send BP
i
(serve(q
i
))  B1
i
(deq(q
i
)) / q
i
6= empty queue . 
+ read buer reset
i
 B1
i
(empty queue)
The medium process is also specied in a single conditional equation. The merge of the
send MB actions (the broadcast to all components except the sender) is expanded to a sum
over IDS, a subset of ID. The name of the process has been shortened to M .
M(IDS;m) =
P
i2 ID;m
m
2M
read PM
i
(m
m
) M(IDnfig;m
m
) / IDS = ; . 
+
P
i2 IDS
send MB
i
(m) M(IDSnfig;m) / IDS 6= ; . 
On our way to a specication of the whole system we rst will derive a specication of the
merge of the local buer processes and the medium. The sequence of component queues
q
i
; i 2 ID; is denoted by the parameter Q.
BM1(Q; IDS;m) = @
H
1
((k
i2 ID
B1
i
(q
i
)) k M(IDS;m))
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Denition of the encapsulation set:
H
1
= fsend MB
i
(m); read MB
i
(m) j i 2 ID;m 2 Mg.
The expansion of this process leads to the following equation. In this equation the substitution
of a new value X for the old value q
i
in the sequence Q is denoted by Q[X=q
i
].
Lemma 6.3
BM1(Q; IDS;m) =
P
i2 ID;m
m
2M
read PM
i
(m
m
) BM1(Q; IDnfig;m
m
) / IDS = ; . 
+
P
i2 IDS
comm MB
i
(m) BM1(Q[enq(m; q
i
)=q
i
]; IDSnfig;m) / IDS 6= ; . 
+
P
i2 ID
send BP
i
(serve(q
i
)) BM1(Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]; IDS;m) / q
i
6= empty queue . 
+
P
i2 ID
read buer reset
i
BM1(Q[empty queue=q
i
]; IDS;m)
Proof: First we look at the merge of the local buer processes. We name this process B1(Q):
B1(Q) = k
i2 ID
B1
i
(q
i
) .
As these processes do not communicate with each other, by applying the expansion theorem
and the axioms of section 6.2, this merge expands to the alternative composition of three
sums over the set ID:
B1(Q) =
P
i2 ID
(
P
m2M
read MB
i
(m)  B1(Q[enq(m; q
i
)=q
i
]))
+
P
i2 ID
send BP
i
(serve(q
i
)) B1(Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]) / q
i
6= empty queue . 
+
P
i2 ID
read buer reset
i
B1(Q[empty queue=q
i
])
The process BM1(Q; IDS;m) is equal to the encapsulated merge of the processes B1(Q) and
M(IDS;m):
BM1(Q; IDS;m) = @
H
1
(B1(Q) k M(IDS;m) )
By applying the axioms and lemma's of section 6.2 and the denition of the encapsulation
operator we get a result that is equal to the process expression as stated in lemma 6.3. We
will not show the straightforward calculations leading to this result. 2
Next we will derive a linear specication of the encapsulated merge of the process BM1
and the protocol processes of all components. The process S1 is parameterised with PS (a
sequence of individual protocol process states ps
i
), J (a sequence of component-ids j
i
), Q,
IDS and m.
S1(PS; J;Q; IDS;m) = @
H
2
((k
i2 ID
P1
i
(ps
i
; j
i
)) k BM1(Q; IDS;m))
Denition of the encapsulation set H
2
:
H
2
= fread BP
i
(m); send PM
i
(m); read PM
i
(m); send BP
i
(m); reset buer
i
;
read buer reset
i
j i 2 ID ; m 2 Mg
The expansion of this process leads to the following equation:
Lemma 6.4
S1(PS; J;Q; IDS;m) =
P
i2 ID
(
P
m
p
2M
comm BP
i
(m
p
)  S1(PS; J;Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]; IDS;m)
/ serve(q
i
) = m
p
^ ps
i
= S . 
+ buer is reset  S1(PS[B=ps
i
]; J;Q[empty queue=q
i
]; IDS;m) / ps
i
= S . )
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+P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S1(PS[C=ps
i
]; J;Q; IDnfig; I(i)) / IDS = ; ^ ps
i
= B . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S1(PS; J;Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]; IDS;m)
/ serve(q
i
) = I(j) ^ ps
i
= C . 
+
P
j 2 IDnfig
comm BP
i
(R(j))  S1(PS[T=ps
i
]; J [j=j
i
]; Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]; IDS;m)
/ serve(q
i
) = R(j) ^ ps
i
= C . 
+ comm BP
i
(R(i))  S1(PS[L=ps
i
]; J;Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]; IDS;m)
/ serve(q
i
) = R(i) ^ ps
i
= C . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S1(PS[C=ps
i
]; J;Q; IDnfig; I(i))
/ IDS = ; ^ j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+ S1(PS[F=ps
i
]; J;Q; IDS;m) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= T . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S1(PS[R=ps
i
]; J [j=j
i
]; Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]; IDS;m)
/ serve(q
i
) = I(j) ^ ps
i
= L . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(R(i))  S1(PS[L=ps
i
]; J;Q; IDnfig; R(i))
/ IDS = ; ^ j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+ comm PM
i
(R(j
i
))  S1(PS[F=ps
i
]; J;Q; IDnfig; R(j
i
))
/ IDS = ; ^ j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= R . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
m
p
2M
comm BP
i
(m
p
)  S1(PS; J;Q[deq(q
i
)=q
i
]; IDS;m)
/ serve(q
i
) = m
p
^ ps
i
= F . 
+
P
i2 IDS
(comm MB
i
(m)  S1(PS; J;Q[enq(m; q
i
)=q
i
]; IDSnfig;m) / IDS 6= ; . )
Proof: We start with the expansion of the merge of the protocol processes P1
i
(ps
i
; j
i
). We
name this process P1(PS; J):
P1(PS; J) =k
i2 ID
P1
i
(ps
i
; j
i
)
These processes have no communicating actions, so the merge expands to the alternative
composition of a number of sums over the set ID:
P1(PS; J) =
P
i2 ID
(
P
m
p
2M
read BP
i
(m
p
)  P1(PS; J) / ps
i
= S . )
: : :
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
m
p
2M
read BP
i
(m
p
)  P1(PS; J) / ps
i
= F . )
Next we consider the encapsulated merge of P1(PS; J) and BM1(Q; IDS;m):
S1(PS; J;Q; IDS;m) = @
H
2
(P1(PS; J) k BM1(Q; IDS;m) )
As in the proof of lemma 6.3, the axioms of section 6.2 and the denition of the encapsulation
operator lead to the result as stated in lemma 6.4. For the sake of brevity the vast amount
of calculations that goes with this transformation is not shown. 2
We now will turn to the verication/validation of Protocol 1. As stated in section 6.2, it
is not possible to give a formal verication of the ACP specication of our protocols. The
following is a rather short and necessarily informal discussion of how a verication should
look like, apart from the restrictions.
In section 3 four requirements have been given for Protocol 1, stated in temporal logic. Here
we recall these requirements in natural language:
P1: \There is always at most one leader".
P2: \There will be innitely often a leader".
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P3: \If a component i is the leader and a component j is participating with j > i, then i
will capitulate sooner or later".
P4: \If j is the successor of i as a leader, then j > i".
In ACP there has been gained a lot of experience in verifying concurrent processes in terms
of required process behaviour (required actions). Examples of such verications can be found
in [Bae90]. The requirements P1{P4, as stated above, are primarily state oriented. P1 and
P2 are concerned with the state of the system at this moment and in the future. P3 and P4
are concerned with transitions from one state to another. In the ACP specications in this
section state information is kept in the data parameters of the process equation. This leads
to requirements that are primarily based on statements about these data parameters. Due to
the lack of a formal data semantics, this is where the strictly formal ACP road ends and an
informal path of natural language reasoning, based on intuitions, begins. We will walk this
path for a short distance.
We capture requirement P1 in the following condition R1:
R1: There exists at most one leader. Stated in terms of the data parameters of the process
S1: the number of leaders in PS is less than or equal to 1.
Requirement P2 is captured as follows. In the specication of the protocol process P1
i
we
add a summand to the leader state:
P1
i
(: : :) = : : :+ : : :+ is leader
i
 P1
i
(: : :) / ps
i
= L .  + : : :
The atomic action is leader
i
does not communicate with any other action from any other
process. By giving this action a lower priority than any other action in the system we
are certain that it only will be chosen if no other action is possible (any more). If the
action is leader
i
is chosen, this means that i is the \nal" leader that has won the election.
According to P4 (see below) we then have that \there will be innitely often a leader" (P2).
If the nal leader is the component with the highest id, together with P1 this also implies
P3: all eventual leaders with an id < max(ID) apparently have capitulated. Stated more
formally:
R2: 
I
 (S1(initial state)) = RS1 with RS1 =   is leader
max(ID)
 RS1
The priority operator now is used in relation with the is leader
i
actions. The abstraction set
I contains all actions, except the action is leader
i
. max(ID) stands for the highest id in the
set of participating components.
Requirement P4 can be captured by adding a queue SQ of subsequent leader ids to the data
parameters of S1 and by requiring that SQ forms a strict increasing row with respect to the
ordering on the ids:
R3: The queue SQ of subsequent leaders is strictly increasing with respect to the ordering
on the ids.
The \verication" of R1 and R3 should imply the addition of R1 and R3 as extra conditions to
every action in S1. For every action it has to be proved that these conditions are invariantly
60
true from the beginning. The \verication" of R2 can be performed by calculating the required
process equality. We will not try to give an informal proof of R1 { R3. Instead, we will point
out two possible ways back to a more formal approach:
 turn to a formalism which has a formal semantics of data as well as processes, e.g. the
formalism CRL ([GP91]). This way out has not been investigated, it is left for future
research.
 turn to the executable formal specication language PSF ([MV90]). PSF has a formal
semantics of both data (based on ASF [BHK89]) and processes (based on ACP). A PSF
specication can be simulated on a computer. In this way we get a validation of the
protocol, rather than a verication. This has been carried out for two specications
of Protocol 1 with a few components. One specication was based on the equation for
System1 in section 5, the other was based on the equation for S1 from this section. A
number of simulation runs with both specications all showed the desired behaviour of
the protocol.
6.4 Intermezzo: timeout semantics and ACP { part 2
In section 5.3 three alternatives were stated for the modelling of a non-premature timeout.
In this section we will look at the third alternative, the data oriented approach.
Once we have a specication of a protocol in the normal form as given in section 6.1, we can
model the timeout semantics by the condition under which the timeout action is enabled: in
the summand : : :+timeout
i
P (D) / c . +: : : we can formulate the condition c according to
the timeout semantics. We distinguish three possible alternatives in formulating this timeout
condition.
1. We can base this timeout condition on the conditions that enable the actions that have
a higher priority than the timeout. The timeout condition becomes true i all these
conditions evaluate to false. This is the counterpart of modelling the timeout with the
priority operator , as discussed in section 5.3. Lemma 6.2 makes a formal translation
from priorities on actions to conditions on actions possible.
2. The condition on which a timeout is enabled can be based on conditions which are
related with specic states of certain constituent processes. Only if these processes are
in the desired state(s) the timeout condition becomes true. In a certain sense this is the
counterpart of the modelling of the timeout with sync actions, as discussed in section
5.3.
3. We can base the condition directly on the desired timeout semantics. This means that
we try to nd the most accurate translation of the timeout semantics as stated in
temporal logic into conditions on the data parameters under which the timeout may be
enabled.
Although alternative 3 probably gives the most accurate implementation of the desired time-
out semantics, in this section we will work out alternative 1. The reason is twofold. First, in
using alternative 3 the specication gets very complicated because of the required labelling of
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messages: the problems mentioned in section 5.3 can be solved only if messages are labelled
with a set of ids. The operations required on this set will make the specication too compli-
cated. The second reason is that, by choosing alternative 1, we maintain the same approach
as with the specications given in section 5.
6.5 Protocol 2
We will follow the same line as with Protocol 1: rst we will give a single equation for the
constituent processes of the protocol, then we will derive an equation for the encapsulated
merge of these processes.
The specication of the protocol process P2
i
looks very much like the adapted specication
of the process P1
i
in the previous section. By adding states and conditions we get a single
equation with several summands. The process P2
i
has two parameters: ps
i
represents a state
of the protocol process, j
i
represents a component-id. In this specication we distinguish
eight states:
 S: the start state.
 B: the buer is reset, no initial I-message has been sent.
 I : the initial I-message has been sent, the timer has not been started yet.
 C: the candidate state, the timer has been started.
 T : an I-message is received by a candidate, but has not been processed yet.
 L: the leader state.
 R: an I-message is received by a leader, but has not been processed yet.
 F : the failed state.
Compared to the states of Protocol 1, only the state I is new.
P2
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) =
P
j2ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P2
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) / ps
i
= S . 
+ reset buer
i
 P2
i
(B; j
i
) / ps
i
= S . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P2
i
(I; j
i
) / ps
i
= B . 
+ start timer
i
 P2
i
(C; j
i
) / ps
i
= I . 
+
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P2
i
(T; j) / ps
i
= C . 
+ read timeout
i
 P2
i
(L; j
i
) / ps
i
= C . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P2
i
(C; j
i
) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+ stop timer
i
 P2
i
(F; j
i
) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P2
i
(R; j) / ps
i
= L . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P2
i
(L; j
i
) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+ P2
i
(F; j
i
) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+
P
j2ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P2
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) / ps
i
= F . 
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We transform the specication of the smart buer process of section 5 into a single equation
of the desired normal form by adding a default \empty message". If the buer contains this
message it is considered to be empty. This implies that max(m; empty message) = m for all
incoming messages. We do not consider this empty message to be an element of the message
set M . The name of the buer process has been shortened to B2
i
, the name of the stored
message is now m
i
.
B2
i
(m
i
) =
P
m2M
read MB
i
(m) B2
i
(max(m
i
;m))
+ send BP
i
(m
i
) B2
i
(empty message) / m
i
6= empty message . 
+ read buer reset
i
B2
i
(empty message)
From the specication of process P2
i
it is clear that a local timer will only be started in
the I-state, after which it will cause a timeout in the C-state or it will be stopped in the
T -state. It will never be started again. Therefore we will not give a re-specication of the
timer process, we will leave the timer state implicit in the specication of the forthcoming
system. The medium process is the same as in section 6.3.
The route to a linear specication of the complete system is the same as in section 6.3. We
will not give all intermediate results, but we will state the nal result at once in the following
lemma. The process S2 is parameterised with PS (a sequence of individual protocol process
states ps
i
), J (a sequence of component-ids j
i
), MS (a sequence of messages m
i
, kept in the
local buers; m
i
can also be the empty message), IDS (a variable set of ids) and a single
message m.
S2(P; J;MS; IDS;m) =
  @
H
3
(k
i2 ID
(P2
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) k B2
i
(m
i
) k T imer
i
) k M(IDS;m))
with H
3
as dened in section 5. The expansion of this process equation leads to the following
equation. The condition for the enabling of the timeout, TO COND
i
, is derived afterwards.
Lemma 6.5
S2(PS; J;MS; IDS;m) =
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S2(PS; J;MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= S . 
+ buer is reset  S2(PS[B=ps
i
]; J;MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m) / ps
i
= S . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S2(PS[I=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDnfig; I(i)) / IDS = ; ^ ps
i
= B . )
+
P
i2 ID
(timer started
i
 S2(PS[C=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / ps
i
= I . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S2(PS[T=ps
i
]; J [j=j
i
];MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= C . 
+ timeout
i
 S2(PS[L=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / TO COND
i
^ ps
i
= C . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S2(PS[C=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDnfig; I(i))
/ IDS = ; ^ j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+ timer stopped
i
 S2(PS[F=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= T . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S2(PS[R=ps
i
]; J [j=j
i
];MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= L . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S2(PS[L=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDnfig; I(i))
/ IDS = ; ^ j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+ S2(PS[F=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= R . )
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+P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S2(PS; J;MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= F . )
+
P
i2 IDS
(comm MB
i
(m)  S2(PS; J;MS[max(m
i
;m)=m
i
]; IDSnfig;m)
/ IDS 6= ; . )
Proof: by lengthy but straightforward calculations, based on the axioms and lemmas of
section 6.2. 2
In section 5 the timeout semantics was modelled by the denition of a priority relation between
certain actions. In lemma 6.2 the relation between the ordering between actions and conditions
in a process expression was stated. From this lemma and the action orderings as given in
section 5.3 we derive the following lemma concerning the condition for the enabling of the
timeout.
Lemma 6.6
TO COND
i
= (IDS = ;)^
V
k2ID
(:(m
k
6= empty message ^ (ps
k
= S _ ps
k
= C _ ps
k
= L _ ps
k
= F ))) ^
V
j2ID;ji
(:(ps
j
= B _ (j
j
< j ^ (ps
j
= T _ ps
j
= R))))
Proof: We split the proof in three parts, for each of the three order relations we will derive
a condition.
1: timeout
i
< comm MB
k
(m) with m 2M; i; k 2 ID.
In the equation of S2 there is only one condition under which a comm MB
k
(m) action is
enabled: IDS 6= ;. According to lemma 6.2 this leads to the following condition for the
enabling of a timeout:
C
i
1
= :(IDS 6= ;) = (IDS = ;)
So the rst ordering leads to the condition that the medium must be empty before a timeout
is enabled.
2: timeout
i
< comm BP
k
(m) with m 2M; i; k 2 ID.
In the equation of S2 there are four conditions under which a comm BP action is enabled.
In each condition it is required that the buer holds a certain message which is not equal
to the empty message. So the second ordering leads to four conditions for the enabling of a
timeout:
C
i
2a
=
V
k2ID
(: (m
k
6= empty message ^ ps
k
= S))
C
i
2b
=
V
k2ID
(: (m
k
6= empty message ^ ps
k
= C))
C
i
2c
=
V
k2ID
(: (m
k
6= empty message ^ ps
k
= L))
C
i
2d
=
V
k2ID
(: (m
k
6= empty message ^ ps
k
= F ))
C
i
2
= C
i
2a
^ C
i
2b
^ C
i
2c
^ C
i
2d
=
=
V
k2ID
(: (m
k
6= empty message ^ (ps
k
= S _ ps
k
= C _ ps
k
= L _ ps
k
= F )))
3: timeout
i
< comm PM
j
(m) with m 2M; i; j 2 ID; j  i.
In the equation of S2 there are three conditions under which a comm PM
i
(m) action is
enabled. According to lemma 6.2 this leads to three conditions for the enabling of a timeout:
C
i
3a
=
V
j2ID;ji
(:(IDS = ; ^ ps
j
= B))
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Ci
3b
=
V
j2ID;ji
(:(IDS = ; ^ j
j
< j ^ ps
j
= T ))
C
i
3c
=
V
j2ID;ji
(:(IDS = ; ^ j
j
< j ^ ps
j
= R))
C
i
3
= C
i
3a
^ C
i
3b
^ C
i
3c
=
= :(IDS = ;) _
V
j2ID;ji
(:(ps
j
= B _ (j
j
< j ^ (ps
j
= T _ ps
j
= R))))
Finally we get TO COND
i
= C
i
1
^ C
i
2
^ C
i
3
which, after some boolean calculations, leads
to the result as stated. 2
The requirements for the verication are the same as for Protocol 1. As with Protocol 1
we halt our investigations of the verication of the protocol at this point. With respect to
the validation of the protocol we refer to a number of successful simulation runs of a PSF
specication of S2. The PSF formalism does not provide the priority operator, so System2
from section 5 could not be specied and simulated in PSF.
6.6 Protocol 3
The required specication of Protocol 3 will be derived in a few big steps. First we give a
specication of the protocol process, then we will give a specication of the whole system.
From section 3 it will be clear that the requirements need special attention. We will discuss
a revision of the requirements R1{R3 at the end of this section.
The specication of the protocol process P3
i
has the same parameters as P2
i
: ps
i
(protocol
state) and j
i
(a component-id). In the specication we distinguish eleven states:
 S: the start state.
 B: the buer is reset, no initial I-message has been sent.
 I : the initial I-message has been sent, the timer has not been started yet.
 C: the candidate state, the timer has been started.
 T : an I-message is received by a candidate, but has not been processed yet.
 L: the leader state.
 R: an I-message is received by a leader, but has not been processed yet.
 F : the failed state.
 X: an I-message is received by a failed process, but has not been processed yet.
 D: the dead state.
 A: the component becomes alive again (the revive action has been executed), the timer
has not been reset yet.
Compared to the states of Protocol 2 the last three states are new. In the specication below
the transition to the dead state is not added to the process term for each separate state S : : :X.
Instead, a single summand with the action crash
i
is added with the condition :(ps
i
= D).
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P3
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) =
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P3
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) / ps
i
= S . 
+ reset buer
i
 P3
i
(B; j
i
) / ps
i
= S . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P3
i
(I; j
i
) / ps
i
= B . 
+ start timer
i
 P3
i
(C; j
i
) / ps
i
= I . 
+
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P3
i
(T; j) / ps
i
= C . 
+ read timeout
i
 P3
i
(L; j
i
) / ps
i
= C . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P3
i
(C; j
i
; ) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+ stop timer
i
 P3
i
(F; j
i
) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P3
i
(R; j) / ps
i
= L . 
+ send PM
i
(I(i))  P3
i
(L; j
i
) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+ P3
i
(F; j
i
) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+
P
j 2 ID
read BP
i
(I(j))  P3
i
(X; j) / ps
i
= F . 
+ P3
i
(B; j
i
) / ps
i
= F . 
+ P3
i
(B; j
i
) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= X . 
+ P3
i
(F; j
i
) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= X . 
+ crash
i
 P3
i
(D; j
i
) / :(ps
i
= D) . 
+ revive
i
 P3
i
(A; j
i
) / ps
i
= D . 
+ reset timer
i
 P3
i
(S; j
i
) / ps
i
= A . 
The (smart) buer process and the medium process are the same as in the previous section.
As with Protocol 2, we will not give a re-specication of the simple timer process, although
for this protocol in each state a reset action has been added.
The process S3 has the same data parameters as S2 in the previous section. So we get
S3(PS; J;MS; IDS;m) =
  @
H
3
(k
i2 ID
(P3
i
(ps
i
; j
i
) k B2
i
(m
i
) k T imer
i
) k M(IDS;m))
with H
3
as dened before. The expansion of this equation leads to the following equation.
The condition TO COND
i
for the enabling of the timeout is the same as in the previous
protocol.
Lemma 6.7
S3(PS; J;MS; IDS;m) =
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S3(PS; J;MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= S . 
+ buer is reset  S3(PS[B=ps
i
]; J;MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m) / ps
i
= S . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S3(PS[I=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDnfig; I(i)) / IDS = ; ^ ps
i
= B . )
+
P
i2 ID
(timer started
i
 S3(PS[C=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / ps
i
= I . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S3(PS[T=ps
i
]; J [j=j
i
];MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= C . 
+ timeout
i
 S3(PS[L=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / TO COND
i
^ ps
i
= C . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S3(PS[C=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDnfig; I(i))
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/ IDS = ; ^ j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= T . 
+ timer stopped
i
 S3(PS[F=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= T . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S3(PS[R=ps
i
]; J [j=j
i
];MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= L . )
+
P
i2 ID
(comm PM
i
(I(i))  S3(PS[L=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDnfig; I(i))
/ IDS = ; ^ j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= R . 
+ S3(PS[F=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= R . )
+
P
i2 ID
(
P
j 2 ID
comm BP
i
(I(j))  S3(PS[X=ps
i
]; J [j=j
i
];MS[empty message=m
i
]; IDS;m)
/m
i
= I(j) ^ ps
i
= F . 
+ S3(PS[B=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / ps
i
= F . )
+
P
i2 ID
(S3(PS[B=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / j
i
< i ^ ps
i
= X . 
+ S3(PS[F=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / j
i
> i ^ ps
i
= X . )
+
P
i2 ID
(crash
i
 S3(PS[D=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / :(ps
i
= D) . )
+
P
i2 ID
(revive
i
 S3(PS[A=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / ps
i
= D . )
+
P
i2 ID
(timer is reset
i
 S3(PS[S=ps
i
]; J;MS; IDS;m) / ps
i
= A . )
+
P
i2 IDS
(comm MB
i
(m)  S3(PS; J;MS[max(m
i
;m)=m
i
]; IDSnfig;m)
/ IDS 6= ; . )
Proof: by lengthy but straightforward calculations, based on the axioms and lemmas of
section 6.2. 2
The correctness requirements for this protocol were given in section 3, stated in temporal
logic formulae. We recall these requirements in natural language:
Q1: \There is always at most one leader".
Q2: \If there is a component that never crashes and all better components are crashed for
ever, there will be innitely often a leader".
Q3: \A component cannot be both leader and crashed".
Q4: \If there is a better living component than the leader, eventually this component will
crash or the leader will abdicate".
Q5: \The abdication of a leader is caused by a crash of the leader or the existence of a better
living component in the past".
Q6: \If a leader abdicates, but does not crash before a new leader emerges, then the identity
of the new leader is equal to or higher than the identity of the old leader".
In the following we will try to give a kind of translation of these requirements to ACP
requirements. Q1 is the same as P1 and can be captured by R1, as given with Protocol 1.
Q3 is obvious: in the process parameter PS each element ps
i
can only have one single value.
So no component can be both leader and crashed. The requirements Q2, Q4, Q5 and Q6 all
contain statements about the behaviour of the system during (subsequent) moments of time.
In ACP the only notion we have in this eld is a notion of fairness, which guarantees that,
under certain circumstances, an action will be chosen sooner or later. As already mentioned
in section 5, in ACP no dierence exists between may and must transitions. So, in ACP we
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can never model a component that never crashes (Q2). In an informal way Q5 is obvious:
from the specication of S3 it is immediately clear that a leader only abdicates after the
reception of a message from a better component or on behalf of a crash. We consider Q4 and
Q6 as too complex to handle in an ACP setting. Instead, we present a weakened variant of
R2: R2
0
which states that a leader can be observed innitely often, when abstracting from all
other actions and when an is leader
i
action has a lower priority than all actions concerned
with message passing.
R2
0
: 
I
 (S3(initial state)) = RS3 with RS3 =
P
i2 ID
  is leader
i
RS3
As with the previous protocols we will not try to give any verication of Protocol 3 with
respect to the requirements. The protocol has been validated by a number of successful
simulation runs of a PSF specication of S3.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have designed, specied and veried a series of dynamic leader election
protocols in broadcast networks. From this extensive case study in protocol design and
verication we make the following remarks.
We started our design by formally capturing the protocol requirements. Rather surprisingly,
no such precise |and abstract| problem specication for dynamic leader election currently
exists in literature. When considering the protocol's correctness this is even more remarkable
as a formal problem specication is indispensable for a formal verication.
Linear-time temporal logic was used so as to express the requirements and to perform the
verication. The formalism turned out to be very convenient for specifying the requirements
in a rather abstract way. Due to the dynamic character of processes it is not straightforward
to give such a specication in, for instance, a process algebraic formalism without aiming at
a particular protocol.
The protocols are constructed in a step-wise fashion starting from the formal requirement
specication. The step-wise approach aids not only in the clarity and conciseness of the pro-
tocols, but also |and more importantly| in reasoning about them (`separation of concerns').
Due to our experience, we believe that this is a feasible approach for the design of complex,
dynamic communication protocols.
A possible (and interesting) extension to the Leader Election problem is to consider identities
that may change during operation opposed to xed identities. We remark that the nal,
fault-tolerant protocol is also applicable in this context.
The use of temporal logic for the specication and verication of communication protocols
is well-known for almost a decade (see e.g. [Lam82, HO83, SPE84]). This case study shows
|once more| that this technique combined with the state transition approach is very conve-
nient. In fact, we have shown that these techniques are also applicable when designing a new
protocol whereas most case studies focus on already existing protocols with commonly agreed
requirements. Furthermore, the dynamic character of processes makes the problem consid-
erably more complex (e.g. the addition of timeouts and presence of two kinds of transitions)
than traditionally veried protocols.
Ideally, detailed proofs of complex protocols are required in which each step of the proof is
formalized and for which informal arguments are minimized. Such detailed proofs are well
possible in our framework and require a formalization of the assumptions, translation of the
protocols into the proof formalism, and so on. The proofs in this paper constitute a useful
stepping-stone towards such a detailed proof. Obtaining a completely formalized proof is
considered to be an interesting subject for further research.
A specication of the protocols in ACP contains a complete formal description, not only of
the various processes but also of the complete distributed behaviour of the protocols. To
this extent ACP has more expressive power than state transition diagrams. The protocols in
this paper are too large for manual algebraic verication. Automated verication in a related
formalism as CRL is left for future research. PSF simulation runs of the protocols appeared
to be very helpful during the various stages of the protocol design.
In general an algebraic verication in ACP consists of a proof that two ACP specications
dene the same process, seen from an appropriate level of abstraction. One specication
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is considered as the requirement specication, while the other serves as the protocol spec-
ication. In some cases, as in our LE protocol, it is very hard to provide a requirement
specication in ACP. This is due to the fact that such a specication must contain a descrip-
tion of all possible admitted behaviours. This is the main reason why we were not able to
give a complete correctness proof in ACP. Instead, we calculated a normal form, which in
general is an important step in most ACP proofs. Further research should point out whether
there is a way to obtain a requirement specication for this kind of protocols in ACP, or that
this problem is intrinsic to ACP.
We think that a combination of the techniques used in this paper may show adequate to give
a correctness proof which is completely formal. This would consist of a specication of the
complete system (including the communication media) in ACP, followed by a transformation
to a normal form in ACP, on which a verication of the requirements using temporal logic is
based. It should be studied how to link ACP and temporal logic formally.
In the rst instance the construction of the protocols was aimed at correctness with respect
to the requirements and minimizing the number of transitions |rather than optimizing their
eciency. As eciency, though, plays an important role in the eld of leader election proto-
cols we analyzed the protocols' worst case message complexity, that is, the maximum number
of messages needed to elect a leader. During this analysis the use of protocol simulation
facilities [MV90] was of considerable help. With the aid of these tools it turned out that the
introduction of an alternative buering mechanism reduces the message complexity signi-
cantly.
This case study shows the usefulness of manual verication for a non-trivial protocol problem
and is helpful in gaining experience of how such a verication is best conducted. Application
to other protocols must show how useful this information turns out to be. This is left for
further study.
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